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Abstract 
In self-defense cases of battered women who kill their abusive husbands, defendants have 
used Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) expert testimony to help justify their acts of 
self-defense.  However, past research demonstrates that BWS is ineffective in persuading 
jurors because it pathologizes the defendant rather than rationalizing her behavior.  
Additionally, BWS highlights passive (i.e., stereotypical) features of a battered woman, 
and such testimony may not apply to a defendant with active (i.e., atypical) features of a 
battered women.  The current study hypothesized that another type of expert testimony, 
Social-Agency Framework (SAF), will persuade jurors to render more lenient verdicts, 
and that the defendant’s passive or active response history will affect verdict decisions.  
Additionally, a meditational model predicted that the effect of mock jurors’ gender on 
verdict decisions will be mediated by their attitudes toward battered women.  In a 
3(expert testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. control) x 2(response history: passive vs. active) x 
2(gender: male vs. female) model, jury-eligible participants (expected N = 510) recruited 
from the website mTurk answered a survey measuring their attitudes toward battered 
women, read a mock trial transcript, and rendered a verdict.  The results indicated non-
significant findings for the effects of expert testimony and response history on verdict 
outcomes.  A full mediation was found, indicating that gender acted as a proxy for jurors’ 
attitudes, influencing their verdict decisions.  This study has strong legal implications that 
highlight the prevailing effect of attitudes and how those attitudes may override the 
effects of expert testimony and defendant response history. 
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Abused Women who Kill: Juror Perspectives on Self-Defense Theories 
 Domestic violence pervades the lives many woman, far greater than those of men.  
Of the total homicides that occurred in the United States between the years of 1976 and 
2005, 35% of the victims were killed by an intimate partner.  Of that 35%, 30% of the 
victims were women.  Between 1993 and 2007, intimate partner homicides amounted to 
14% of all recorded homicides with 70% of the victims being female.  Considering the 
gender disparity in domestic homicide victims, the law needs to specifically address 
whether to penalize women who defend themselves against domestic violence (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 2009).  Should the law view a woman who kills her abusive spouse in 
self-defense in the same manner as it does a woman who kills a stranger in self-defense? 
Self-defense 
 Connecticut jury instructions for self-defense, from which the current study 
adapted its stimulus material, defines self-defense as: “[1] a person is justified in using 
reasonable physical force upon another person to defend [herself] [2] from what [she] 
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and [3] [she] may 
use such degree of force which [she] reasonably believes to be necessary for such 
purpose” (Conn. Criminal Jury Instructions ch. 2.8-1, § 53a-19, 2010).  Self-defense 
consists of two reasonable belief determinations made by the trier of fact: that the harm 
was imminent and that the use of deadly force was necessary to defend from harm.  The 
Court requires a subjective-objective test, meaning that in order to determine if self-
defense occurred, the jury must both subjectively and objectively apply the law.  The 
subjective aspect refers to considering the perspective of the defendant (e.g., what the 
defendant sincerely believed).  The objective part evaluates whether the defendant’s 
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actions were reasonable, and not irrational, under the circumstances.  In other words, 
would a reasonable person share similar beliefs as the defendant given the defendant’s 
circumstances?  Taken from the Connecticut Judicial Branch, self-defense consists of the 
following four elements: 
1. The defendant actually believed that someone else was using or about to use 
physical force against [her].  If you have found that the force used by the 
defendant was deadly physical force, then this element requires that the defendant 
actually believed that the other person 1) was using or about to use deadly 
physical force against [her], or 2) was inflicting or about to inflict great bodily 
harm upon [her]. 
2. That belief was reasonable because a reasonable person in the defendant's 
circumstances, viewing those circumstances from the defendant's perspective, 
would have shared that belief. 
3. The defendant actually believed that the degree of force [she] used was necessary 
to repel the attack.  Again, if you have found that the force used by the defendant 
was deadly physical force, then this element requires that the defendant actually 
believed that deadly physical force was necessary to repel the attack. 
4. That belief was reasonable because a reasonable person in the defendant's 
circumstances, viewing those circumstances from the defendant's perspective, 
would have shared that belief (Conn. Criminal Jury Instructions ch. 2.8-1, § 53a-
19, 2010). 
The state of Connecticut places the burden of proof solely on the prosecution to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.  The 
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defense need only raise the issue of self-defense during trial.  The prosecution may meet 
its burden by disproving at least one of the aforementioned elements of self-defense. 
  The subjective-objective test arose from a history of legal modification of the 
defense.  Before the subjective test was suggested, the jury was instructed to view 
battered women in the same manner as the average person, and thus apply the same 
definition of “reasonable beliefs” to both categories of people.  Some states have 
transitioned from a solely objective test to a subjective-objective test.  For example, in 
State v. Kelly (1984), the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division held that the 
“reasonableness” clause in self-defense cases, in which the defendant must have defended 
herself as any reasonable person would have, applies to women suffering from Battered 
Woman Syndrome (BWS) differently than it does to the general population.  In this case, 
the defendant Kelly claimed violent beatings from her husband over a period of seven 
years.  One day her husband continuously assaulted and chased her.  The defendant 
believed that he intended to kill her, so she withdrew a pair of scissors from her purse and 
fatally stabbed him.  At trial, defense proffered a self-defense case and requested that an 
expert witness testify about the defendant having suffered from BWS.  The trial court 
ruled the expert testimony as inadmissible because it was irrelevant.  On appeal, the judge 
reversed the admissibility ruling, stating that the “reasonableness” test applied in self-
defenses must conform to the limited psychological perspective of the afflicted defendant 
at the time of the charged act, and imposed a subjective standard of self-defense based on 
the defendant’s viewpoint.  Thus, in the state of New Jersey, expert testimony on BWS 
should be admissible in self-defense cases in order to address the defendant’s perspective, 
which lies outside the ken of the jury. 
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 In 1996, the issue of BWS expert testimony similarly appeared in the California 
Court of Appeals in People v. Humphrey.  The defendant, Humphrey, had undergone 
frequent beatings by her live-in boyfriend.  The boyfriend had shot at her, and missed, the 
night before the self-defense incident.  The next day Humphrey fatally shot him and 
claimed self-defense.  An expert witness testified to her psychological state at the time of 
the killing and stated that the defendant suffered from BWS.  The trial court instructed 
the jury that although it may consider expert testimony to determine if the defendant 
genuinely believed deadly force was necessary, the jury could not use the expert 
testimony as evidence in determining whether that belief was reasonable.  The California 
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling, but the Supreme Court of California reversed the 
judgment, holding that BWS expert testimony provides relevant evidence regarding 
reasonableness and the subjectiveness of a defendant’s belief to defend herself.  
Therefore, a California jury may consider the expert testimony when deciding both 
questions of genuine belief of imminent harm and reasonableness of that belief.  
California courts hold that the expert testimony is relevant to the defendant’s credibility 
because it dispels common misconceptions that a battered woman may choose to leave 
her abuser at any point.  The cases of New Jersey and California demonstrate that some 
states have legitimized the use of expert testimony in self-defense cases to shed light on 
the subjective component of “reasonableness.” 
History of BWS 
 Lenore Walker developed the idea of Battered Woman Syndrome in an effort to 
increase awareness of intimate partner violence against women (Walker, 1979).  The 
theory consists of two characteristics of an abusive relationship: the cycle of violence 
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theory and learned helplessness.  Walker’s cycle of violence breaks down a battered 
woman’s intimate relationship into three stages: tension-building, acute battering, and 
loving contrition.  The tension-building stage manifests when the couple bickers and the 
tension between the two partners gradually increases along with the frequency of verbal 
arguments.  The acute-batting stage is an incident in which the batterer reaches the zenith 
of his aggression and violently attacks his partner in an uncontrollable rage.  The final 
stage of the cycle, loving contrition, is characterized by the batterer apologizing to his 
partner and promising to never hurt her again. 
 Walker derived the concept of learned helplessness from Seligman and Maier’s 
(1967) study.  The researchers placed dogs in an apparatus designed to induce electric 
shocks.  In the escapable condition, the dogs could terminate the shock by pressing a 
panel, and in the inescapable condition, the dogs could not terminate the shock.  The dogs 
in the escapable condition learned to press the panel whereas the dogs in the inescapable 
one learned to be helpless.  Learned helplessness was corroborated by the second phase 
of the study, in which the inescapable dogs were placed in escapable apparatuses.  Even 
though the dogs had the option to terminate the shock by pressing a panel, they did not 
react in any way to the shock.  Seligman and Maier (1967) suggested that the dogs failed 
to react because they had been conditioned to resign to the pain of the shock.  Walker 
applied the theory of learned helplessness to battered women.  She explained that battered 
women’s failed attempts to curb the abuse over time condition them to believe that the 
violence is inescapable and thus out of their control.  Battered women become more 
passive in their response to violence, and, given the cyclical nature of the intimate partner 
violence, the women come to view themselves as constantly threatened by imminent 
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danger of death of serious bodily harm.  BWS expert witnesses testifying in defense of 
battered women who kill their abusers submit that the battered woman’s use of deadly 
force was reasonable given her constant fear of death or serious harm.  BWS expert 
testimony also serves to explain why she believed she had no other options than to kill 
her abuser (Walker, 1984). 
Expert testimony 
 Legal precedent highlights the significant role expert testimony plays in providing 
mitigating evidence in domestic violence cases that the jury otherwise would not have 
considered.  Maguigan (1991) reviewed 239 appellate cases of women in the U.S. who 
killed their abusive partners in self-defense and found that appellate judges had 
overturned 40% of those cases based on expert testimony on battering and its effects on 
the defendant.  Consequently, appellate courts appear to more frequently allow the 
inclusion of psychological expert testimony in battered women self-defense cases. 
 In states that abide by the subjective-objective standard, defense lawyers possess 
an advantage in including expert testimony in their cases.  Studies show that expert 
testimony more effectively persuades jurors to vote in favor of the defendant compared to 
providing no expert testimony.  Expert testimony aids jurors in contextualizing the 
defendant’s killing in a frame of self-defense given her limited psychological and social 
state.  Otherwise, jurors may inappropriately apply a form of “reasonableness” to 
psychologically and socially limited women when it more suitably applies to mentally 
and socially stable people (Schuller & Rzepa, 2002).  Schuller and Hastings (1996), in 
their foundational research for the subject of psycholegal self-defense cases of battered 
women, confirmed the advantages of the defense offering some form of expert testimony 
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as opposed to none at all.  In the condition with no expert testimony, participants 
rendered “Guilty” verdicts more often than those in the expert testimony condition.  
Schuller, McKimmie, and Janz’s (2004) conducted a similar study that corroborated 
Schuller and Hastings’ (1996) findings, suggesting that mock jurors who did not hear any 
expert witness testimony were more punitive in rendering their verdict whereas mock 
jurors who listened to expert testimony were more likely to render a “Not Guilty” verdict.  
Schuller et al. (2004) proposed that defense expert witnesses aid the juror in 
understanding the defendant’s limited options in responding to her husband’s abuses.  
Without explanation from an authority figure (i.e., the expert witness), jurors may have 
more difficulty placing themselves in the shoes of the defendant and thus be unable to 
empathize with her. 
Although defense attorneys should prefer BWS expert testimony over no expert 
testimony, researchers have warned against its use.  The term itself, Battered Woman 
Syndrome, implies an illness or disorder, which may encourage jurors to look for 
“symptoms” of BWS in the defendant’s behavior (Schneider, 1986; Browne, 1987).  
Thus, BWS directs jurors to interpret the defendant’s actions within the framework of 
dysfunction instead of as an outcome of her environment and mental state (Raitt & 
Zeedyk, 2000).  For example, BWS expert testimony may focus more on the defendant 
suffering from learned helplessness, a psychological dysfunction, as opposed to 
discussing how her abuser may have prevented her from obtaining a job, talking to her 
friends or family, or seeking help from a community outreach program. 
Response history 
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  BWS invokes the stereotype of a battered woman – passive, irrational, and 
“emotionally damaged” (Schuller & Rzepa, 2002).  If the defendant did not exhibit the 
stereotypical characteristics of a battered woman, then jurors may doubt the credibility of 
BWS expert testimony.  Many domestically abusive relationships do not exhibit cyclical 
violence and Walker’s (1986) own study reveals that only two-thirds of women allegedly 
suffering from BWS reported experiencing cyclical violence (Plumm & Terrance, 2009).  
Gondolf and Fisher (1988) proposed that rather than developing learned helplessness, 
some battered women become more active in attempting to end the violence.  Jurors may 
consider the BWS expert testimony as irrelevant if the defendant deviated from the 
prototypical model of a battered woman (Plumm & Terrance, 2009).  Schuller and Rzepa 
(2002) examined whether mock jurors rendered punitive verdicts to an “active” 
defendant, one who strayed from the prototype of a battered woman, while other mock 
jurors rendered lenient verdict to a “passive” defendant, one who conformed to the 
battered woman stereotype.  They also gave half of the mock jurors nullification 
instructions, which suggest that their verdict may be based on their conscience if they felt 
that the law as applied to the case would produce an unjust verdict.  The researchers 
found that when not given the nullification instructions, compared to when given 
nullification instructions, mock jurors gave more punitive verdicts when the defendant 
was active.  The active defendant also received harsher verdicts overall than in the 
passive condition.  With nullification instructions, the active defendant, compared to the 
passive one, received more manslaughter and fewer self-defense verdicts, and without 
nullification instructions, the active defendant received more murder verdicts.  This 
finding demonstrates that battered women defendants will have a difficult time 
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convincing the jury of their self-defense claims when they have a response history 
incongruent to the jurors’ stereotypical view of battered woman’s behavior. 
 In these cases, past research has shown that male jurors in general render more 
punitive verdicts than female jurors.  Russell and Melillo (2006) evaluated the verdicts of 
610 undergraduate students and manipulated whether the defendant conformed to the 
battered woman prototype (atypical vs. typical) and the defendant’s response history to 
the abusive relationship (active vs. passive).  The active response history described the 
defendant as having fought back to her abusive husband, and the passive response history 
indicated a submissive woman who tried to placate her husband.  Women assigned 
significantly fewer “Guilty” verdicts than men across conditions.  Overall, male jurors 
believed that the defendant had more options available to her than killing, did not believe 
she fit the typology of a battered women, and assumed that the defendant was more in 
control of her behavior and emotions at the time of the homicide than did female jurors. 
Prototype theory and attitudes toward battered women 
 Russell and Melillo (2006) expanded upon prototype theory, which argues that 
jurors view defendants based on prevailing stereotypes.  Typicality describes the degree 
of conformance, and it consists of prototypical features.  The greater the prototypical 
characteristics of a battered woman the defendant possesses, the greater the perceived fit 
to a battered woman (Smith, 1991).  Mock jurors in the atypical/active defendant 
condition rendered more punitive verdicts than in the typical/passive condition, and as a 
result, mock jurors perceived greater options available to killing.  Respondents believed 
that the typical/passive defendant’s story seemed more plausible and that the defendant’s 
actions better met the self-defense requirements than did those of the atypical/active 
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defendant.  These results suggest that jurors enter the courtroom with preconceived 
notions of the characteristics of battered women and selectively search for evidence 
confirming or disconfirming that prototype.  Therefore, predispositional attitudes may act 
as a filter through which jurors evaluate the defendant’s culpability (Terrance & 
Matheson, 2003).  Russell and Melillo propose that juror decision-making occurs in a 
graded structure, in which jurors compare the defendant’s characteristics to that of the 
prototypical battered woman, and if sufficient overlap of characteristics exists, then jurors 
will find a “Not Guilty” verdict. 
Social-agency framework 
 Past research thus suggests that BWS does not help all abused women who have 
killed in self-defense, and its characterization of the defendant may ineffectively persuade 
jurors that the law excuses her actions.  Recently, researchers have investigated an 
alternative type of expert testimony, social-agency framework (SAF).  Unlike BWS, 
which focuses solely on the woman’s psychological state, SAF emphasizes the social 
reality of women in abusive relationships.  This type of testimony explains, for example, 
the woman’s economic dependency on her abuser, the limitations of the criminal justice 
system in restraining the abuser from her, lacking social support in the workplace and 
medical, religious, and residential community, fear of child services taking away her 
children, and inadequate aid from the police (Barnett, 2001).  Additionally, SAF 
examines the consequences of the defendant trying to seek help.  An abuser may retaliate 
against his victim even after she leaves the relationship.  Mahoney (1991) described this 
event as separation assault, and it occurs so often that a significant number of battered 
women killed by their abusive partner were no longer living together at the time of her 
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death (Dutton, 1993).  SAF explains the lack of options available (or perceivable) to the 
abused woman and how she may genuinely fear that her abuser would kill her.  This type 
of expert testimony directly addresses the reasonableness of fatal self-defense, whereas 
BWS focuses on the defendant’s psychological pathology. 
 Plumm and Terrance (2009) examined the persuasiveness of SAF expert 
testimony as compared to BWS expert testimony and no expert testimony.  Participants 
rendered the most favorable verdicts for the defense in the SAF condition than any other 
condition.  They also rated the defendant in the SAF condition as having the fewest 
alternatives to killing her abuser and as the least typical of a battered woman than in other 
conditions. 
Plumm and Terrance (2009) also noted gender differences in juror differences 
between the SAF and BWS expert conditions.  While women overall rated the defendant 
as reasonable and justified in her actions, men only rated her actions as reasonable and 
justified after hearing the SAF expert testimony.  SAF more effectively than BWS aided 
men to contextualize the woman’s behavior given her constrained socioeconomic 
environment, and hence make male jurors better able to appreciate the reasonableness of 
her self-defense.  In their study, Schuller, McKimme, and Janz (2004) found that 
Canadian male participants rendered a significantly greater number of punitive verdicts in 
the condition of no expert testimony than in the expert testimony condition, whereas 
female participants’ verdicts displayed no difference between the two conditions.  
Defense expert testimony may favorably affect male jurors more than female jurors 
because it appears to educate men about the circumstances of domestically abused 
women. 
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 The existing literature on jury decision-making in cases of domestic violence and 
self-defense, however, remains small and underdeveloped.  Schuller and Hastings (1996) 
provided the foundational work from which other researchers have based their expert 
testimony and other case materials.  However, in many studies, BWS and SAF expert 
testimony were not clearly distinct from one another, which may explain why few 
studies, excluding that of Schuller and Hastings (1996), were able to find a significant 
difference between verdicts in the BWS and SAF expert testimony conditions.  In past 
studies, SAF expert testimony often included more psychological than social factors, 
which make it resemble BWS expert testimony.  Consequently, verdicts may have been 
confounded with the overlap between the two types of expert testimonies.  Furthermore, 
no research as of yet has manipulated both the response history (passive vs. active) and 
expert testimony type (SAF vs. BWS) in the same experiment.  Therefore, the current 
study presents a 3x2x2 design: expert testimony (BWS vs. SAF vs. control/none), 
response history (passive vs. active), and jurors’ gender (male vs. female). 
Hypothesis 1 
 It is hypothesized that there will be a main effect of gender on verdict decisions, 
with female participants rendering more lenient verdicts across all conditions.  The 
reason is because past studies have shown women to better empathize with battered 
women defendants and consistently across conditions (BWS vs. SAF vs. no expert 
testimony) render more lenient verdicts. 
Hypothesis 2 
 The second hypothesis predicts a main effect of expert testimony type on verdict 
confidence, specifically that participants will render the most punitive verdicts in the 
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control condition and the most lenient verdicts in the SAF condition.  The control 
condition should produce the most “Guilty” verdicts because no psychological or social 
explanation is given for the defendant’s actions, which reduces the likelihood of jurors 
finding the defendant’s actions as reasonable, a requirement of self-defense. SAF expert 
testimony should induce the most “Not Guilty” verdicts because it does not typify a 
battered woman as passive, like BWS expert testimony does, and thus readily applies to 
both passive and active defendants.  Moreover, SAF more effectively explains the social 
circumstances of the battered women, which may facilitate men’s understanding of the 
battered woman’s actions. 
Hypothesis 3 
 The third hypothesis suggests an interaction between gender and expert 
testimony, in which the decrease in “Guilty” verdicts from BWS to SAF expert testimony 
condition will be greatest among male jurors than female jurors.  Male participants 
should be most persuaded by the SAF expert testimony to render “Not Guilty” verdicts.  
Women’s verdicts should remain more constant relative to those of men.  This interaction 
should occur because SAF, as mentioned in the second hypothesis, offers a social-based 
explanation of the defendant’s actions instead of a psychologically based one.  Previous 
studies have shown that BWS pathologizes battered women and reduces the credibility of 
a reasonable self-defense.  Schuller and Rzepa (2002) demonstrated that jurors overall do 
not believe that BWS expert testimony helps to rationalize the defendant’s behavior, but 
female jurors remain relatively favorable toward the defendant in both BWS and SAF 
expert testimony conditions.  Male jurors, on the other hand, tended to believe that SAF 
is more suitable to the requirements of self-defense.  Thus, the change from “Guilty” 
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verdicts in the BWS condition to “Not Guilty” verdicts in the SAF condition should be 
largest among men.  Women being more victim empathetic, they will have more “Not 
Guilty” verdicts in the BWS condition and as a result have less contrasts compared to the 
SAF condition in their verdict decisions. 
Hypothesis 4 
 The fourth hypothesis proposes an interaction between expert testimony type and 
response history.  According to prototype theory, participants in the BWS expert 
testimony, passive condition should perceive a greater fit in the defendant’s typicality to 
that of a battered woman, and participants in the BWS, active condition should perceive 
fewer overlaps between the defendant’s typicality and the prototypical model of a 
battered woman.  Therefore, participants should render more lenient verdicts in the BWS, 
passive condition and more punitive verdicts in the BWS expert testimony, active 
condition. 
Hypothesis 5 
 The fifth hypothesis presents a meditational model (see Model 1 in Appendix Q).  
The interaction between response history and expert testimony and its effect on verdict 
confidence should be mediated by the defendant’s typicality (i.e., degree of perceived fit 
to a prototypical battered woman).  The interaction between response history and expert 
testimony should reflect participants’ positive or negative reactions toward expert 
testimony depending on how well the expert testimony explains the defendant’s actions 
given her response history.  The effect on verdict decisions, though, is not direct, but 
rather is mediated by defendant typicality.  Mock jurors should interpret the defendant’s 
action, as explained by the expert testimony and contextualized by her response history, 
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according to how well the defendant’s characteristics fit those of a stereotypical battered 
woman.  The stronger the perceived fit, the more likely participants will render a lenient 
verdict compared to a weak perceived fit. 
Hypothesis 6 
 The sixth hypothesis also proposes a meditational model (see Model 2 in 
Appendix Q).  The interaction between response history and expert testimony and its 
effect on verdict confidence should be mediated by the juror’s perception of expert 
witness credibility.  Jurors will evaluate the expert witness’s credibility based on the 
perceived fit of the defendant’s response history and the expert witness’s explanation of 
that response history.  If the response history and expert testimony contradict each other, 
such as in the case of the BWS expert testimony, active condition, then jurors will find 
the expert witness less credible.  The expert witness’s perceived credibility should 
influence the direction of the verdict because credibility determines the weight of that 
testimony as evidence.  The lower the credibility, the less likely the expert testimony will 
be used as evidence in favor of the defendant.  The higher the credibility, the more likely 
the expert testimony will be used as evidence in favor the defendant. 
Hypothesis 7 
Finally, the seventh hypothesis puts forth a third meditational model (see Model 3 
in Appendix Q).  The effect of the participant’s gender on verdict confidence should be 
mediated by their attitudes toward spousal abuse.  Attitudes toward spousal abuse are 
measured in the context of how much blame the participants assigns to the victim of 
domestic violence, how well they empathize with the victim, and the degree of control 
the victim has over the abusive relationship.  The current research predicts that women 
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will share more empathetic attitudes toward battered women and that men will hold 
harsher attitudes toward battered women.  This effect should occur because women tend 
to better empathize with battered women defendants, and such empathy should influence 
women’s attitudes toward battered women to be more understanding of the defendant’s 
inability to control her partner’s violence.  On the other hand, male jurors’ relative lack of 
empathy contributes to a negative attitude toward battered women in which they are more 
likely to assign blame to the defendant for her actions.  Consequently, women with their 
more positive attitudes and men with their negative attitudes will lead each gender to 
render lenient and punitive verdicts, respectively. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 593) were recruited from the online survey Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk).  Completion rate was 86% as a result of 83 participants failing to complete the 
survey.  After excluding the incomplete responses, the sample size was 510 participants.  
Participants, who all have accounts on mTurk, chose to take the survey in return for 
monetary compensation.  The first 150 responders received twenty cents.  In order to 
collect more participants at a higher rate, monetary compensation was increased to fifty 
cents.  There was no statistical significance between verdict confidence scores for the 
groups that were paid 20 cents (M = 1.29, SD = 5.41) and 50 cents (M = .43, SD = 5.50), 
t(508) = 1.54, p = .73.  All participants received a questionnaire asking if they met all the 
requirements for jury-eligibility, and 100% were eligible jurors.  The high eligibility 
percentage is due to several reasons: (1) because of mTurk’s restrictions, only 
participants from within the United States and over the age of 18 could access the survey, 
Running head: ABUSED WOMEN WHO KILL 18 
and (2) before accepting to participate, the survey description informed them that only 
jury-eligible people may continue.  Participants’ age ranged between 18 and 79 years old 
(M = 35.89).  Participants who were below the age of 30 composed 44.9% of the entire 
sample and those 55 and older formed 11.6% of the group.  Males totaled 203 
participants (39.8%), and women accounted for 307 (60.2%) of the participants.  
Approximately 81% of participants were White (N = 413), 5.9% were Black (N = 30), 
5.5% were Asian (N = 28), 3.3% were Hispanic (N = 17), and the rest were Other (N = 
22). 
Procedure 
Participants randomly chose a number from one to six and the selected number 
directed them to the corresponding condition.  Each participant received a written 
transcript of the imaginary trial of Ann Hudson, an abused woman who killed her 
husband and is claiming self-defense.  All were asked to pretend to serve as real jurors.  
The participants read the judge’s instructions, both counsels’ opening statements, direct 
and cross examinations of prosecution and defense witnesses, and closing statements.  
They were then asked a series of questions pertaining to their verdict, perception of the 
defendant’s typicality as a battered woman, credibility of the expert witness and 
testimony, and their leniency toward battered women.  Finally, they answered a 
demographics questionnaire. 
Expert testimony 
 The content of the participants’ written transcripts varied according to condition.  
In the BWS expert testimony condition, the expert witness says that the defendant 
suffered from BWS and explains the psychological characteristics that led the defendant 
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to kill her husband (see Appendices E and F).  In the SAF expert testimony condition, the 
expert witness describes SAF and explains how the defendant’s social circumstances led 
her to kill her husband (see Appendices G and H).  The opening and closing statements in 
each condition make reference to the type of expert testimony presented.  The third 
testimony condition is a control, in which there is no expert witness testimony, and the 
opening and closing statements make no reference to such testimony (see Appendices C 
and D). 
Response history 
 The written transcripts also differ in the types of response histories described in 
the witness examinations.  The defendant’s past history of abuse is depicted as either 
passive or active.  In the passive condition, the prosecution witness and defendant 
provide details of the defendant’s submission to her husband, her willingness to please, 
self-blame, and poor attempts at seeking help (see Appendices C, E, and G).  In the active 
condition, the prosecution witness and defendant offer the opposite impression of the 
defendant.  They indicate she was more active in seeking help, blamed her husband 
instead of herself, and sometimes fought back (see Appendix D, F, and H).  The opening 
and closing statements do not reference response histories in either condition. 
 The current study examines the following between-subjects factors in a factorial 
design: 3(expert testimony: battered woman syndrome vs. social-agency framework vs. 
no expert testimony) x 2(response history: passive vs. active) x 2(jurors’ gender: male vs. 
female). 
Measures 
Verdict 
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 Jurors offered a verdict (Guilty: -1, Not Guilty: 1), which was multiplied by their 
confidence in that verdict, ranging from 1 to 7, to produce their verdict composite score 
(range: confidently “Guilty” (-7) to confidently “Not Guilty” (7); see Appendix N). 
Attitudes toward spousal abuse and battered women 
 Adapted from Kirsten Nilsen and Lawrence Wrightsman’s (2003) scale for 
Attitudes toward Spouse Abuse and Battered Women, this scale contains 21 items, each 
using a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix I).  Participants rated the agreeableness of 
each statement, such as, “Women can leave abusive relationships if they really want to.”  
Twelve of the items were reverse coded and the scores were averaged.  Lower scores 
suggested conservative views of domestic violence, such as the participant blaming the 
woman for staying in the abusive relationship.  Higher scores displayed more 
sympathetic views toward the abused woman and did not hold her as accountable for her 
predicament.  Although this scale has not been published, it is the only scale created yet 
that measures jurors’ views on battered women who kill.  The attitudes scale in the 
current study produced a good internal reliability, with Cronbach’s α = .793. 
Typicality 
 Participants answered two questions measuring their perception of whether the 
defendant resembled a typical battered woman.  This scale aims to investigate prototype 
theory, in which jurors compare the defendant’s behavior to that of a prototypical 
battered woman.  The first item asked a binary (Yes: 0, No: 1) question and the second 
provided a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7 (see Appendix K).  The Likert scale item 
asked, “Does the defendant’s behavior fit with the behavior of a typical battered 
woman?”  The Likert score was used as a measure of perceived typicality while the 
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binary item was used as a check against the Likert scale.  Participants who answered 
“Yes” on the binary item indicated that they believed the defendant resembled a normal 
battered woman, and those who answered “No” did not hold such a belief.  Lower scores 
on the Likert scale indicate no perceived fit with a stereotypical battered woman and 
higher scores suggested a perfect fit.  Thus, positive responses on the first question 
should positively correlate with the second question’s scored responses higher than 4, and 
the inverse should occur with negative responses on the first question. 
Self-defense manipulation check 
 Five questions using a 7-point Likert scale were asked to assess whether 
participants applied reasonableness to their verdict decision (see Appendix M).  For 
example, one question asked participants to rate how much they agree or disagree with 
the following statement: “The defendant's belief in imminent harm was reasonable.”  One 
question was reverse coded, and all the ratings were averaged together to create a self-
defense check averaged score.  The significance of this is to see how well the participants 
understood the definition of self-defense as it related to their verdict.  Lower scores 
suggest that the defendant was not reasonable in her action and higher scores indicate 
more reasonableness.  Therefore, lower scores should correlate with “Guilty” verdicts 
and higher scores with “Not Guilty” verdicts.  The self-defense scale demonstrated good 
internal consistency with α = .874 
Response history scale 
This 7-item scale measured whether the participant believed the defendant was 
active or passive (see Appendix J).  To illustrate, one question read, “The defendant had 
low self-esteem,” and another read, “The defendant was confrontational.”  The statements 
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referring to active behaviors (three total) were reverse coded and all seven scores were 
combined to form one averaged score.  The range of scores was between 1 and 7, lower 
scores indicating an active response history and the higher scores indicating a passive 
response history.  The response history scale produced an acceptable internal consistency, 
α = .698. 
Expert witness credibility 
This scale was adapted from the Witness Credibility Scale (Brodsky, Griffin, & 
Cramer, 2010), which previously had been found to be reliable (α = .95).  It measures 
the participants’ perceived credibility of the expert by asking question such as, “Was Dr. 
Baxter trustworthy?”  The scale was adapted to the current study and shortened from 20 
questions to 11 questions and used a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix L).  The Witness 
Credibility Scale in the current study similarly produced a high Cronbach’s α = .958, an 
excellent internal reliability score. 
 
Results 
Typicality scale 
A t-test found a significant main effect of the perceived typicality of a battered 
woman on response history.  Participants in the passive condition believed the defendant 
was more typical of a battered woman (M = 5.29, SD = 1.20) than participants in the 
active condition (M = 4.74, SD = 1.06), t(508) = 14.59, p < .001. 
Self-defense manipulation check 
A t-test was conducted to determine the main effect of participants’ perception of 
the defendant’s reasonableness on the dependent variable of verdict confidence.  
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Participants who voted “Not Guilty” scored significantly higher on the reasonableness of 
self-defense (M = 5.57, SD = .89) than those who voted “Guilty” (M = 3.53, SD = 1.17), 
t(500) = 22.16, p < .001. 
Response history check 
 The response history check assessed whether participants discriminated between 
the active and passive conditions.  Participants in the active condition perceived the 
active defendant (M = 4.31, SD = 1.09) differently from the passive condition (M = 5.13, 
SD = 1.01).  The participants rated the defendant as more active in the active condition 
and more passive in the passive condition, t(496) = -8.72, p < .001. 
Hypothesis 1 
 The first hypothesis suggested a main effect of jurors’ gender on verdict 
decisions, with female participants rendering more lenient verdicts across all conditions.  
The results support this hypothesis.  A 3(expert testimony: BWS vs. SAF vs. none) x 
2(response history: passive vs. active) x 2(jurors’ gender: male vs. female) ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect for gender on verdict decisions.  Men rendered more 
“Guilty” verdicts (M = -.13, SD = .42) and women more “Not Guilty” verdicts (M = 1.30, 
SD = .32), F(1, 508) = 7.44, p = .007. 
Hypothesis 2 
 The second hypothesis predicted a main effect of expert testimony type on verdict 
outcomes, specifically that participants will render the most punitive verdicts in the 
control condition and the most lenient verdicts in the SAF condition.  This hypothesis 
was unsupported by the data.  The 3x2x2 ANOVA showed no main effect for the control 
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expert testimony (M = .42, SD = 5.48), BWS (M = .44, SD = 5.70), and SAF conditions 
(M = 1.17, SD = 5.42) on verdict decisions. 
Hypothesis 3 
 The third hypothesis suggested an interaction between jurors’ gender and expert 
testimony, in which male jurors, more so than women, will render more “Not Guilty” 
verdicts in the SAF than BWS condition.  The data did not support this hypothesis; no 
interaction was found between gender and expert testimony. 
Hypothesis 4 
 The fourth hypothesis proposed an interaction between expert testimony type and 
response history, which produced non-significance.  Passive (M = .85, SD = 5.48) and 
active conditions (M = .47, SD = 5.43) also produced non-significant main effects on 
verdict outcomes. 
Hypothesis 5 
 The fifth hypothesis predicted a meditational model, specifically that the 
interaction between expert testimony and response history and its effect on verdict 
outcome should be mediated by the defendant’s typicality.  As stated in the fourth 
hypothesis, the interaction between expert testimony and response history was not 
significant, and as a result, the meditational model was not supported. 
Hypothesis 6 
 The sixth hypothesis similarly suggested a meditational model, in which the 
interaction between expert testimony and response history and its effect on verdict 
outcome should be mediated by the juror’s perception of expert witness credibility.  
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Because the interaction between expert testimony and response history was not 
significant, the meditational model was not supported. 
Hypothesis 7 
 The seventh hypothesis presented another meditational model; the effect of the 
participant’s gender on verdict decision should be mediated by their attitudes toward 
spousal abuse and battered women.  Unlike in the 3x2x2 ANOVA, in which the main 
effect of gender on verdict outcome was significant, the main effect produced non-
significance in a 3x2x2 ANCOVA, with pretested juror attitudes being the covariate.  
Only the participants’ attitudes toward spousal abuse was significant, F(1, 508) = 35.71, 
p < .001.   
In order to test for attitudes as a mediating factor for verdict outcomes, a 
regression analysis was first used to determine the correlation between gender and verdict 
confidence.  Jurors’ gender significantly predicted verdict outcomes, β = .14, t(509) = 
3.23, p < .01, and gender also accounted for 2.0% of verdict confidence outcomes, R2 = 
.020, F(1, 509) = 10.44, p < .01. 
A second regression analysis measured the correlation between attitudes toward 
spousal abuse and verdict confidence.  Participants’ pretested attitudes significantly 
predicted verdict outcomes, β = .29, t(509) = 6.70, p < .001, and their attitudes accounted 
for 8.1% of verdict confidence outcomes, R2 = .081, F(1, 509) = 44.89, p < .001. 
A third regression analysis determined if the pretested attitudes, when taken into 
consideration, would remove the significant correlation between gender and verdict 
confidence.  As predicted, when taking into account participants’ attitudes toward spousal 
abuse, the attitudes were a significant predictor of verdict confidence, β = .27, t(508) = 
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5.98, p < .001, and gender was no longer a significant predictor, β =.06, t(508) = 1.38, p 
> .10.  This model of attitudes and gender explained for 8.4% of verdict confidence 
outcomes, R2 = .084, F(2, 508) = 23.43, p < .001. 
In the last step to verify full mediation, a fourth regression analysis was conducted 
to find the correlation between gender and attitudes toward spousal abuse.  Participants’ 
gender was a significant predictor of their attitudes, β = .30, t(509) = 7.16, p < .001, and 
their gender explained 9.1% of the variance in attitudes they held, R2 = .091, F(1, 509) = 
51.19, p < .001. 
Given these four regression analyses, there was full mediation, in which gender’s 
effect on verdict confidence was mediated by participants’ attitudes toward spousal abuse 
and battered women (see Appendix R). 
Exploratory analyses 
 The results have yielded no significance for a main effect of response history on 
verdict outcomes.  Past research suggests, though, that an active response history tends to 
be incongruent to the juror’s perception of stereotypical characteristics of a battered 
woman.  Jurors also interpret expert testimony based on how well it applies to the 
defendant.  Schuller and Rzepa’s (2002) study revealed that when the expert testimony 
did not compliment the prototypical model of a battered woman, jurors believed that the 
expert testimony did not help the defendant meet the requirements for self-defense, and 
the jurors viewed the expert witness as less credible.  A post-hoc hypothesis predicted an 
interaction between response history and expert witness credibility; that if the response 
history is active, participants should view the BWS expert witness as less credible 
because expert witness describes the defendant’s behavior according to passive 
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characteristics, which directly contradicts the active response history.  If the response 
history is active, then the BWS expert witness should be viewed as more credible because 
the testimony and passive response history describe the defendant’s characteristics in the 
same manner.  The SAF expert witness should be viewed as more credible than the BWS 
one in both the active and passive response history conditions because it does not rely on 
response history as evidence, but rather explains why the defendant’s given social 
circumstances led her to behave in self-defense, which jurors, according to past research, 
have found more convincing than BWS expert testimony. 
To investigate whether response history and perceived expert witness credibility 
interacted to affect verdict confidence, a regression analysis was conducted.  First, 
because of multicollinearity concerns, the Expert Credibility Scale scores along with the 
response history scores were centered by subtracting the mean from each of the 
independent variables.  A regression analysis of the centered variables revealed no 
significance for the interaction of response history and expert witness credibility on 
verdict confidence.  However, significance appeared for expert witness credibility on 
verdict confidence.  Thus, participants’ perceived expert witness credibility significantly 
predicted verdict confidence, β = .37, t(349) = 7.12, p < .001, and credibility accounted 
for 13.4% of verdict confidence outcomes, R2 = .134, F(3, 349) = 18.07, p < .001. 
In an effort to further understand jurors’ perception of expert witness credibility, a 
regression analysis was conducted to determine if the jurors’ attitudes predicted how they 
would rate expert witness credibility.  The theory behind this analysis is that attitudes 
may act as an information filtering mechanism, through which participants select and 
interpret evidence that are parallel to their preexisting attitudes.  If jurors’ attitudes favor 
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the expert testimony, then they should view the expert witness as more credible, and 
when their attitudes bias them against the testimony, jurors should view the expert 
witness as less credible.  The regression analysis revealed that jurors’ attitudes toward 
spousal abuse significantly predicted how they rated the expert witness’ credibility, β = 
.43, t(350) = 8.84, p < .001.  Jurors’ attitudes accounted for 18.3% of their perception of 
expert witness credibility, R2 = .183, F(1, 350) = 78.17, p < .001. 
 Another regression analysis investigated whether age predicted verdict decisions.  
This analysis was conducted because the demographics data revealed a highly varied age 
group, ranging from 18 to 79 years old.  The mean age was 35.89 years old with a 
standard deviation of 13.79 years.  Given this range, there was a large enough sample size 
to compare younger and older adults’ attitudinal differences based on their age.  Age may 
act as a proxy for attitudes toward spousal abuse because as a person grows older, he or 
she may gain more experience with domestic violence, and as a result, be more likely to 
hold attitudes empathetic toward the defendant. 
Age was split into two groups: people under the age of 30 and those who are age 
30 and above.  The split in age aimed to categorize people into categories of young adult 
and older adult.  In order to determine if age acted as a predictor for one’s attitudes 
toward spousal abuse and battered women, a regression analysis was run.  Age 
significantly predicted participants’ attitudes, β = .17, t(509) = 3.82, p < .01.  
Specifically, age accounted for 2.8% of participants’ attitudes, R2 = .028, F(1, 509) = 
14.57, p < .01.  People under the age of 30 (M = 5.10, SD = .79) held more biased 
attitudes against battered women than people over the age of 30 (M = 5.24, SD = .82). 
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Discussion 
Manipulation checks 
 The self-defense scale showed that participants who voted “Not Guilty” more 
likely believed that the defendant beliefs’ and behavior were reasonable and met the 
standards of self-defense.  Participants who voted “Guilty” were less likely to believe in 
the defendant’s reasonableness.  This finding suggests that participants understood the 
requirements of self-defense and corresponded their verdict decisions to those 
requirements.  Additionally, the self-defense scale includes both subjective and objective 
components of self-defense, indicating that mock jurors noticed the subjective and 
objective aspects of self-defense and may have considered both of them in rendering their 
verdict. 
 The response history scale measured whether participants discriminated between 
a passive and active defendant.  The results suggest that participants perceived a 
difference between them, associating more passive characteristics with the passive 
defendant, and more active characteristics with the active defendant.  This finding shows 
that the participants successfully noticed the response history manipulation, but this scale 
did not assess whether participants’ decision-making process were differently affected by 
the defendant’s response history. 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis predicted a main effect of jurors’ gender on verdict outcomes.  
The results support this hypothesis, demonstrating that, across all conditions, female 
participants rendered more lenient verdicts, and male participants rendered more punitive 
verdicts.  While this finding links gender with verdict decisions, it should not be assumed 
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that gender on its own causes certain verdict outcomes.  Rather, the main effect may 
suggest that gender possess different experiences in memory that lead them to interpret 
the same information differently.  Past research has consistently shown that jurors tend to 
better empathize with victims of the same sex.  In cases of abuse directed toward women, 
female jurors are more victim empathetic than male jurors (Sinclair & Bourne, 1998).  
The current study shows that women offer lenient verdicts compared to men who offer 
punitive ones.  Men and women’s contrasting personal experiences may explain the 
gender differences.  The statistics presented in the introduction of this paper display the 
magnitude of female victims of domestic violence, and the number of male victims is 
significantly lower.  Women are more likely to be adversely affected by domestic abuse, 
and in addition to this increased probability for women than men, women may be more 
likely to hear from other women their experiences with domestic violence.  Whether in 
the form of a statistic, personal experience, or anecdotes from other women, domestic 
violence is more accessible in memory for women than in men.  The availability heuristic 
proffers that easily accessed pieces of memory serve as the immediate, main sources of 
information on which to base one’s judgment.  Therefore, women, more often than men, 
may immediately find in memory a more personal relationship to the battered woman’s 
predicament. 
Hypothesis 2 
 The second hypothesis presented a main effect of expert testimony on verdict 
confidence, specifying that participants should render the most punitive verdicts in the 
control condition and the most lenient verdicts in the SAF condition.  The null hypothesis 
was supported.  Non-significance may suggest that, in actuality, no difference exists 
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between BWS and SAF expert testimony.  Whether or not BWS seems to pathologize the 
defendant, this type of expert testimony has no more negative impact on verdict outcomes 
than SAF has. 
The subjective-objective standard may also have contributed to the non-
significance.  Mock jurors may have followed the subjective requirements by effortfully 
placing themselves in the defendant’s shoes, whether or not they heard any expert 
testimony.  Consequently, expert testimony may have offered nothing new for the mock 
jurors to consider, because participants were already attempting to understand the 
defendant’s point of view. 
Furthermore, the participants may have been pooled from a high need for 
cognition (NFC) population.  The website mTurk may attract participants who possess 
high NFC, which is defined as an innate motivation and joy for thinking (Shestowsky & 
Horowitz, 2004).  MTurk requires a noticeable effort on the part of visitors to learn how 
to navigate and understand the website.  MTurk is not user-friendly because it requires 
people to understand its language, which is idiosyncratic to that website (e.g., an “HIT, 
Human Intelligence Task, refers to a task with monetary compensation).  Furthermore, 
although no knowledge of HTML is required to use the website as a participant, 
researchers must know basic HTML in order to post their surveys online.  It may be the 
case that some mTurk participants have also used the website as researchers and have 
studied HTML.  Thus, mTurk participants are likely to be of a group of people who are 
able to learn new terminologies, use technology with some basic HTML, and are willing 
to partake in surveys for little money.  It can be surmised that mTurk participants are 
genuinely motivated to engage in cognitive effort and enjoy the task.  Shestowsky and 
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Horowitz (2004) examined how high NFC and low NFC mock jurors evaluate the quality 
of an argument during deliberations.  The researchers found that low NFC participants 
are more likely to accurately discriminate between strong and weak arguments, whereas 
high NFC participants failed to discriminate between the two.  Shestowsky and Horowitz 
(2004) reasoned that low NFCs were sensitive to modifying their attitudes on a particular 
issue if they believed the argument was stronger than their own beliefs.  High NFC 
participants, on the other hand, were more likely to believe that their own attitudes were 
more compelling than the argument posed to them, whether or not the argument was 
strong or weak.  Relating these findings to the current study, mTurk participants of high 
NFC may have believed that their preexisting attitudes outweighed the value of the expert 
testimony, and thus eliminated such testimony for the factors they considered for 
rendering a verdict. 
Hypothesis 3 
  The third hypothesis predicted an interaction between jurors’ gender and expert 
testimony on verdict outcomes; comparing the BWS to SAF condition, male participants 
should have rendered more “Not Guilty” verdicts in the SAF condition, whereas the 
change in verdicts from the BWS to SAF condition should not have been as large for 
female participants.  The results did not support this hypothesis.  There was no difference 
in verdict decisions across expert testimony conditions.  The first hypothesis 
demonstrated a difference in female and male verdict decisions, in which men rendered 
more punitive verdicts.  However, within each gender group, expert testimony type failed 
to influence a change in verdict.  The lack of significance may indicate that, in reality, 
SAF expert testimony does not affect jurors’ decisions differently from BWS expert 
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testimony.  As mentioned before, the subjective-objective standard may have contributed 
to non-significance by substituting for the effect that any expert testimony would have on 
jury decision-making.  Particularly, mock jurors may have already been primed to 
attempt to empathize with the defendant’s psychosocial circumstances (e.g., the 
defendant’s genuine fear for her life) at the time of the crime.  Potential high NFC or 
tendency to believe in one’s own beliefs over external information may have also 
contributed to the lack of an interaction between gender and expert testimony type on 
verdict decisions. 
Hypothesis 4 
 The fourth hypothesis proposed an interaction between response history and 
expert testimony type on verdict decisions, which was unsupported by the data.  
Hypotheses two and three already demonstrated non-significance across expert testimony 
types.  Passive and active response histories produced no main effects on verdict 
decisions.  Participants, however, did compare the defendant to the prototypical model of 
a battered woman.  The typicality scale revealed a significant main effect of defendant 
typicality on response history.  The main effect revealed that participants in the passive 
condition believed the defendant fit the stereotypical image of a battered woman more so 
than the participants in the active condition.  The results demonstrate that the response 
history manipulation successfully affected participants’ perception of the defendant as a 
typical battered woman.  The passive condition invoked the stereotype of a battered 
woman because it drew from the characteristics that BWS claims should manifest in 
battered women (e.g., helpless, weak, blaming herself, making excuses for her batterer’s 
actions, and fearful).  An active response history included behaviors that diverged from 
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BWS’s claims, such as fighting back against her abuser, assigning all the blame to him, 
trying to make him feel guilty for his actions, trying to leave the house, telling other 
people about the abuse, and refusing to quit her job for him.  The representativeness 
heuristic may account for jurors’ perceptions of typicality.  Jurors’ preconceived notions 
of a battered woman serves as a subjective representation of all battered women.  The 
representativeness heuristic enables jurors to quickly categorize the passive defendant as 
a battered woman and exclude the active defendant from that category (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  Prototype theory further explains that not only do jurors categorize or 
exclude defendants under the label of a battered woman, but also jurors evaluate the 
defendant’s typicality on a gradient.  The more prototypical features that are present in 
the defendant, the greater a perceived fit with the prototype (Smith, 1991).  Therefore, the 
results support the prototype theory. 
 Yet, the results failed to support an interaction between response history and 
expert testimony type on verdict outcomes.  Such non-significance may indicate that the 
defendant’s response history has no bearing on the verdict itself.  Response history’s lack 
of influence on verdict may be demonstrated by the participants’ failure to react to 
contradictory evidence pertaining to response history.  In particular, the BWS expert 
witness’s credibility remained unaffected by response history.  In the active condition, the 
defendant fought back against her batterer, tried to leave the house, and blamed her 
batterer and attempted to make him feel guilty for the abuse.  The BWS expert witness 
stated nearly the opposite of those behaviors: “Dr. Baxter stated that battered women 
typically believe that they can change their batterer’s behavior, and Ann believed David’s 
promises of change…Ann displayed signs of “learned helplessness,” meaning that over 
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time in her relationship with David, Ann learned that resistance to the abuse was futile 
and may backfire by provoking further abuse. She was resigned to staying in the 
relationship and was submissive to her husband.”  Unfortunately, the current study did 
not ask participants if they noticed any contradictions between the expert testimony and 
the defendant’s past behaviors.  The lack of significant findings may be explained by the 
prevailing effect of gender and the mediating effect of attitudes toward spousal abuse on 
verdict decisions.  Perhaps the participants, guided by their preexisting attitudes toward 
spousal abuse, unconsciously neglected the contradictory information provided by the 
BWS expert witness in order to form a stable image of the defendant.  Consequently, 
response history may have been filtered out during jurors’ decision-making process. 
Hypothesis 5 
 The fifth hypothesis suggested a meditational model involving an interaction 
between response history and expert testimony on verdict decisions, mediated by the 
defendant’s typicality.  As stated for the fourth hypothesis, there was no significance 
found for an interaction between response history and expert testimony.  Therefore, no 
meditational model could be examined. 
Hypothesis 6 
 The sixth hypothesis predicted a similar meditational model that involved the 
interaction between response history and expert testimony on verdict decisions, mediated 
by the juror’s perception of expert witness credibility.  Again, no significant interaction 
was found, and consequently, the proposed meditational model could not be 
demonstrated. 
Hypothesis 7 
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 The first hypothesis predicated a main effect of gender on verdict decisions.  The 
outcome was consistent with this expectation, but the main effect ceased to have a direct 
impact on verdict decisions once participants’ predispositional attitudes were considered.  
The seventh hypothesis explains this phenomenon.  The effect of participants’ gender on 
verdict decisions was mediated by their attitudes toward spousal abuse and battered 
women. 
As explained before, women may hold different memories of domestic violence 
than men that are easily accessible because women have a higher probability than men of 
experiencing domestic violence to some degree (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2009).  As a 
result, each gender may form divergent attitudes toward spousal abuse.  Attitudes in 
general affect verdict outcomes, as demonstrated by past research conducted on death-
qualified juries.  Death-qualified jurors are potential jurors who are willing to impose the 
death penalty with sufficient evidence, and excludable jurors are those who would never 
vote in favor of the death penalty.  Cowan, Thompson, and Ellsworth (1984) studied the 
differences in conviction proneness between excludable jurors and death-qualified jurors, 
and they found that the latter group is more likely to convict the defendant.  This research 
touches upon the predispositional attitudes that people hold when they first walk into the 
courtroom.  Cowan et al.’s (1984) study also revealed that death-qualified jurors are less 
likely to stringently apply the reasonable doubt standard and interpret the weight of 
evidence differently from excludable jurors.  Extending this research to the current study, 
women and men (like excludable versus death-qualified jurors) tend to hold different 
attitudes toward spousal abuse and battered women.  Male and female mock jurors’ 
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contrasting attitudes may then act as a filter through which they select and interpret 
evidence and apply it to the self-defense standard of reasonableness. 
 Attitudes help shape jurors’ schemas in which they form their expectations for 
how spousal abuse occurs and how victims react.  Attitudes consist of a person’s 
dispositional stance in favor of or against a class of issues or people, in this case a 
battered woman.  Bem (1981) proposed the gender schema, which explains two different 
schematic processing by males and females.  A schema is a cognitive network of 
associations that organizes and integrates information to form an individual’s perception.  
Schemas offer an evolutionary advantage by integrating information efficiently, 
excluding irrelevant pieces and highlighting the most relevant ones, into a comprehensive 
story.  Expanding upon the definition of a schema, Bem (1981) explains a gender schema 
as a cognitive “readiness to process information on the basis of sex-linked associations.”  
She argues that men and women learn to encode information based on their gendered 
experiences.  Therefore, male and female jurors, given their respective experiences with 
domestic violence, have different cognitive availability of schemas – schemas that are 
easily accessed – which leads each gender to hold divergent attitudes toward spousal 
abuse.  These attitudes serve as an information filter to select (or exclude) evidence from 
trial and jurors’ cognitive schemas integrate the selected evidence into a cohesive whole.  
Such information filtering results in men and women rendering different verdicts.  The 
seventh hypothesis thus reiterates the theory that jurors’ attitudes mediate the effect of 
other factors, particularly gender, on verdict decisions. 
Post-hoc analysis 
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 A post-hoc exploratory analysis examined whether the juror’s perception of 
expert witness credibility affected verdict outcomes, and indeed, a significant main effect 
was found.  Because the expert witness testified for the defense, the more that jurors 
assigned credibility to the expert witness, the more likely the jurors voted in favor of the 
defense.  The less credible the jurors perceived the expert witness, the more likely jurors 
were to render a “Guilty” verdict.  This main effect, unfortunately, does not shed light on 
how expert testimony affects verdict decisions.  Rather, it may reiterate the theory that 
jurors hold preexisting attitudes about the case, and if the expert witness’s testimony was 
in line with those attitudes, then participants may view that witness as more credible than 
if the testimony contradicted their attitudes. 
In another exploratory analysis, the current results demonstrated that participants 
viewed the expert witness as more credible if that witness’s testimony complimented 
jurors’ attitudes toward spousal abuse.  In fact, mock jurors’ attitudes accounted for 
18.3% of their perception of expert witness credibility.  When the expert witness 
testimony contradicted jurors’ attitudes, participants viewed the expert witness as less 
credible.  This finding supports the theory that attitudes act as an information biasing 
mechanism, which interprets information according to jurors’ predispositional beliefs. 
Age also served as a proxy for jurors’ attitudes.  The results revealed that people 
under the age of 30 held more biased attitudes against battered women than people over 
the age of 30.  This finding poses a conundrum because past research reported the 
opposite effect: older people tend to hold biased attitudes against battered women than 
younger people.  For example, Worden and Carlson (2005) surveyed people on their 
beliefs about battered women and found that older respondents, more so than younger 
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people, accused domestic violence victims of masochism.  Curiously, though, that same 
study found that younger respondents, more often than older people, believed that 
domestic violence victims had more options of escape from abusive relationships.  It is 
uncertain how to interpret the current findings relating to age and juror attitudes.  Perhaps 
the mTurk sample included older adults who had more personal experiences with 
domestic violence, which contributed to them empathizing more with battered women.  If 
this were the case, then past research may be correct in that both younger and older 
respondents each hold mixed attitudes toward battered women, but an individual’s 
personal experience with domestic violence may polarize his or her attitudes, despite age.  
Therefore, if the older participants in the current mTurk sample had more of a 
relationship to domestic violence, then their attitudes may be more favorable toward 
battered women.  Unfortunately, because this study did not include a scale measuring 
participants’ exposure to domestic violence, the effect of mock jurors’ age on attitudes 
remains unexplained. 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 The current study instructs participants to render their verdict according to the 
burden of proof of the prosecution proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Burden of 
proof is the minimum level of persuasion that the prosecution or defense (in this case 
only the prosecution) must meet in order to win the verdict.  A prosecution’s burden of 
proof of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt means that the jury can only find 
a “Guilty” verdict if the evidence presented removes all reasonable doubt from the jurors’ 
minds.  Some states, such as Connecticut, Oklahoma, and Virginia, require the 
prosecution to exclusively bear the burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt 
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(Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 2010; Elkins, 2006).   Other states, such as 
Maryland, also require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that self-
defense is inappropriate, if and only if the defense raised the issue of self-defense first.  
Most states, however, consider self-defense to be an affirmative defense, and 
consequently, both the defense and prosecution assume a burden of proof.  The burden of 
proof is often lower for affirmative defenses, either using clear and convincing evidence 
(the evidence must be substantially and more probable to be true than not) or a 
preponderance of evidence (the evidence is more likely than not to be true).  The current 
study adopted Connecticut’s burden of proof, in which the prosecution bears the sole 
burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  The reason the current study used 
the Connecticut burden of proof is because that state provided to the public actual, 
verbatim jury instructions, and in an effort to remain ecologically valid, the study 
incorporated those publicly available jury instructions.  The high burden of proof may 
account for the lack of difference between the expert testimony conditions and the control 
condition.  It may be the case that whether expert testimony was present, mock jurors 
may have conceived of at least one reasonable doubt that would invalidate the 
prosecution’s case. 
 In addition, not all states use the subjective-objective standard.  Some legal 
jurisdictions abide by the objective standard, in which jurors are instructed to determine 
whether a reasonable person would have acted in the same way as the battered woman 
defendant.  Legal scholars have noted judicial responses to the objective test and how 
some judges have moved to issuing the subjective-objective standard (Crocker, 1985).  
However, no studies have examined whether jurors’ decision-making processes are 
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affected by which standard is used.  In the current study, expert testimony did not 
influence jurors’ verdict decisions, perhaps because they were already primed to attempt 
to think from the defendant’s point of view.  This priming may have arisen from the 
subjective-objective standard, in which jurors were instructed to consider how the 
defendant perceived reasonableness and whether that was legitimate given her 
circumstances.  As a result, the subjective-objective standard may have eliminated any 
effects of expert testimony on verdicts decisions that otherwise may have been found if 
using the objective standard.  
 The current study also failed to measure participants’ past exposures to spousal 
abuse.  In order to more deeply investigate the meditational model involving gender, 
attitudes, and verdict outcomes, future research should measure participants’ prior 
exposure to domestic violence.  This may tap into mock jurors’ cognitive availability of 
domestic violence and allow for researchers to find a potential difference between men 
and women’s cognitive availability, and also support for the availability heuristic as an 
underlying mechanism for this finding. 
 Furthermore, a scale should have been used to identify how participants weight 
the evidence that influenced their verdict.  Weighting of evidence is important in 
understanding how attitudes affect the value participants assign to each piece of 
information. Anderson’s (1971) integration theory describes information processing as 
the product of the information’s weight and scale value.  The weight is personal 
significance the individual assigns to the piece of information, and the scale value 
measures the subjective probability that the expected outcome will occur.  Attitudes 
toward spousal abuse may affect the weight component of the integration model and 
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change the jurors’ perception of what evidence most suitably, if at all, applies to the 
standard of reasonableness.  The current results suggest that participants’ attitudes 
predicated their perception of expert witness credibility.  Based on this finding, future 
studies should test the hypothesis that mock jurors with empathetic attitudes toward 
battered women place greater weight on the expert witness testifying for the defendant, 
whereas participants with attitudes attributing blame to the battered woman may be more 
likely to discount the expert testimony when rendering a verdict.  The current study 
provides evidence linking attitudes toward perception of credible evidence.  The non-
significant findings for the main effects of expert testimony and response history on 
verdict decisions may be reflective of this integration theory; participants’ attitudes may 
have served as the overriding influence in weighting evidence.  Perhaps jurors’ 
preexisting attitudes help to strengthen or discredit evidence, regardless of the type of 
evidence (e.g., BWS vs. SAF vs. no expert testimony), in order to support their attitudes 
toward battered women. 
Legal implications 
 During the process of voir dire, lawyers attempt to remove potential jurors 
exhibiting biases that might impede their objective judgment, with particular focus on 
jurors that lawyers suspect may render an unfavorable verdict.  The current study 
demonstrates that gender and attitudes may induce a biasing effect, in which jurors do not 
begin trial with predetermined verdicts, but rather with predetermined gender-related 
attitudes that filter out certain evidence incongruent to that schema.  Lawyers should be 
aware of the meditational process of a jurors’ decision-making and use that knowledge to 
develop a mechanism, such as a questionnaire, enabling them to identify jurors with 
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certain attitudes during voir dire.  Identifying attitudes beforehand may lead to balanced 
juries, in which there is an equal distribution of attitudes toward battered women in each 
jury.  Ideally, a more nuanced voir dire process would lead to a fairer trial, further 
reducing the possibility of the entire jury being composed of like-minded individuals. 
 Although no significance was found between the different expert testimony 
conditions, any form of expert testimony plays an invaluable role in the courtroom.  
Jurors are not as well informed as experts in matters of victims’ responses to domestic 
violence.  Misinformation about battered women may render jurors unable to find the 
defense case reasonable, even when the evidence would suggest the defendant did act 
reasonably.  For example, Dodge and Greene (1991) compared the knowledge of jurors 
and researchers specializing in domestic violence.  Their study showed that jurors were 
less knowledgeable than experts about characteristics of abusive relationships.  For 
example, jurors were less informed than researchers about how abusers persuade the 
battered woman to stay in a relationship with him (e.g., the abuser promises to never hurt 
her again or she feels dependent on him).  The same study revealed that jurors were less 
likely to believe in the battered woman’s fear of her batterer killing her and in the 
necessity of using deadly force to prevent her batterer from killing her.  Moreover, jurors 
were less able than experts on domestic violence to understand why a battered woman 
would blame herself for the abuse and how anxiety and depression may affect the 
woman’s ability to effectively cope with the abuse.  Given this informational gap 
between researchers and jurors, expert testimony is necessary to fill this informational 
gap and should thus be included during the defense’s case.  The current study suggests 
that whether BWS or SAF expert testimony affect jurors’ verdict decisions, lawyers will 
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need to utilize some persuasive tool, such as expert testimony, to inhibit (or augment) 
jurors’ attitudes toward the defendant.  Otherwise, the evidence on its own, without any 
interpretation by an expert, may leave jurors to interpret the evidence according to their 
own individual attitudinal biases. 
The current study used a subjective-objective standard for jurors to evaluate the 
reasonablenesss of self-defense.  Not all states use this standard, and the current non-
significant findings might indicate significant implications for the subjective-objective 
self-defense standard.  One study demonstrated that the subjective definition of 
reasonableness has led jurors to render more “Not Guilty” verdicts compared to when the 
objective definition was used (i.e., judges instructed jurors to evaluate the defendant’s 
actions in the perspective of the average reasonable person) (Follingstad, Shillinglaw, 
DeHart, & Kleinfelter, 1997).  Although little research has been conducted on the effects 
of subjective versus objective definitions of self-defense on verdict outcomes, it may be 
the case that when jurors are instructed by the judge to evaluate the defendant’s actions 
from the defendant’s point of view, then jurors may be more likely to empathize with the 
defendant and render a lenient verdict.  If the current study, then, had used an objective 
standard without the subjective component, then perhaps participants would have been 
more punitive.  Consequently, lawyers should be aware of the standards of their local 
jurisdictions, and if the self-defense case occurs in an objective standard jurisdiction, 
lawyers should attempt to induce an effortful attempt on the part of the jurors to attempt 
to understand from the defendant’s perspectives.  Such empathy induction might be 
encouraged through expert testimony, for example. 
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Battered women face a unique dilemma when being evaluated by a jury.  They 
must present a case that facilitates understanding between the jury and her rendition of 
events and enable the jury to empathize with her mental state.  Not enough research has 
yet been conducted to provide sufficient advice to defense attorneys representing battered 
women, but the current research highlights the mediating role of jurors’ preexisting 
attitudes and encourages attorneys to pay attention to those attitudes during the jury 
selection process. 
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Appendix A 
Consent Form 
 
 I have been invited to take part in a research study to learn more about jury-
decision making.  This study has been approved by the Claremont McKenna College 
Institutional Review Board (IRB).  This research study will be conducted by Shahrzad 
Nikoo as part of her Bachelor’s thesis work.  Her faculty advisor is Dr. Daniel Krauss, a 
professor of Psychology at Claremont McKenna College. 
 I agree to be in this research study and I acknowledge that my participation will 
include the following: 
1. Completing a questionnaire about my background (age, gender, education, etc.); 
2. Reading a trial case transcript concerning a battered women charged with first-
degree homicide; 
3. Completing another questionnaire relating to the case transcript, including 
rendering my verdict. 
This survey will require about one hour of my time.  The following information 
informs me of the risks of participating: I may find the nature of the topic of battered 
women upsetting, and if I do, I will be provided with information on counselors I may 
contact.  I understand, however, that this is not a real life case and, instead, is a fictional 
case that is supposed to reflect true events. 
I acknowledge that I may benefit educationally from this study on court cases 
involving battered women.  It may contribute to scientific knowledge by providing my 
answers that may serve to reveal new scientific findings. 
[For mTurk participants] I will be paid $.50 for reading the case transcript and 
completing the survey.  I understand that by receiving payment, my name may be 
recorded by Amazon, since it acts as a proxy; however, I also understand that my name 
will not be associated with my survey answers, that it will not be used for any purpose, 
and that only the researcher can have access to it.  In order to receive the payment, I must 
be jury-eligible (at least 18 years old, a U.S. citizen, and not have been convicted of a 
felony).  If I wish, I may print a copy of this consent form for my personal records. 
[For Sona Systems participants] I will be compensated for my time with 1 course 
credit.  In order to receive course credit, I must be jury-eligible (at least 18 years old, a 
U.S. citizen, and not have been convicted of a felony). 
Confidentiality of my records will be strictly maintained by keeping my name 
separate from my answers.  Answers will be stored in a password protected website. 
I am voluntarily participating in this study.  I may refuse to participate, skip any 
question, or withdraw at any time without penalty. 
If I have any additional questions or wish to report a research-related problem, I 
may contact the researcher at (925) 989-0289; snikoo12@cmc.edu; Claremont McKenna 
College, 742 N. Amherst Ave, Claremont, CA 91711, or I may contact the supervisor at 
(909) 607-8504; dkrauss@cmc.edu; Claremont McKenna College 742 N. Amherst Ave, 
Seaman Hall 231, Claremont, CA 91711.  For questions about your rights as a research 
participant, you may contact the chair of Claremont McKenna College’s Institutional 
Review Board, Michael O’Neill at (909) 607-8336, or via email at moneill@cmc.edu. 
My checkmark in the box below indicates that I have read and understood all of 
the above. 
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 By checking this box, I agree that I have read this form and consent to 
participate in this survey.  
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Appendix B 
Jury Eligibility 
 
Please read the following criteria for jury-eligibility: 
- At least 18 years old 
- A United States citizen 
- Have never been convicted of a felony 
- Proficient English speaker 
 
Do you meet all these requirements? 
  Yes  No 
 
If you selected “No” please do not continue with the survey.  
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Appendix C 
 Please pretend you are a juror.  The following pages include a court transcript 
with preliminary jury instructions, opening statements, summaries of witness testimonies, 
closing statements, and jury instructions. 
 Please  read the following pages carefully as if you were an actual juror in the 
case.  
Control, Passive Condition 
Preliminary Jury Instructions 
 
Ladies and gentleman of the jury:  
 You have been selected and sworn as the jury to try the case of State v. Ann 
Hudson.  This is a criminal case.  Ms. Hudson is charged with murder in the first degree.  
The definition of the elements of first-degree murder will be explained to you later. 
 It is your solemn responsibility to determine if the State has proved its accusation 
beyond a reasonable doubt against Ann Hudson.  Your verdict must be based solely on 
the evidence, or lack of evidence, and the law. 
 It is the judge’s responsibility to decide which laws apply to this case and to 
explain those laws to you.  It is your responsibility to decide what the facts of this case 
may be, and to apply the law to those facts.  Thus, the province of the jury and the 
province of the court are well defined, and they do not overlap.  This is one of the 
fundamental principles of our system of justice. 
 Before proceeding further, it will be helpful if you understand how a trial is 
conducted.  At the beginning of the trial, the attorneys will have an opportunity, f they 
wish, to make an opening statement.  The opening statement gives the attorneys a chance 
to tell you what evidence they believe will be presented during the trial.  What the 
lawyers say is not evidence, and you are not to consider it as such.  Following the 
opening statements, witnesses will be called to testify under oath.  They will be examined 
and cross-examined by the attorneys.  After the evidence has been presented, the 
attorneys will have the opportunity to make their final argument. 
 Following the arguments by the attorneys, the court will instruct you on the law 
applicable to the case.  After the instructions are given, you will then consider your 
verdict.  You should not form any definite or fixed opinion on the merits of the case until 
you have heard all the evidence, the argument of the lawyers, and the instructions on the 
law by the judge.  Until that time, you should not discuss the case amongst yourselves.  
The case must be tried by you only on the evidence presented during the trial in your 
presence and in the presence of the defendant, the attorneys, and the judge.  Jurors must 
not conduct any investigation of their own.  In this age of electronic communication, I 
want to stress again that just as you must not talk about this case face-to-face, you must 
not talk about this case by using an electronic device.  Do not discuss this case or ask for 
advice by any means at all, including posting information on an Internet website, chat 
room, or blog. 
 Jury instructions have finished and the Court is now ready to hear opening 
statements. 
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Prosecution Opening Statement 
 
 Hello, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  My name is Frederick Jones and I 
represent the State in this case.  On the night of October 17, 2011, David Hudson invited 
his sister and two friends to his house for a casual party.  His wife, the defendant Ann 
Hudson, got into an argument with her sister-in-law.  David became involved in the 
argument and he and his wife were yelling at each other.  The defendant, enraged, ran up 
the stairs and slammed the door to her bedroom.  Everyone downstairs could hear her 
yelling and banging against the wall.  David went upstairs to the bedroom.  Then, two 
shots were fired.  David Hudson was dead.  Today, you will hear from Morgan Johnson, 
the deceased’s sister who was at the party.  She will tell you how the defendant was 
yelling in her bedroom for ten whole minutes before David went upstairs.  She will tell 
you that David looked calm – and not angry – when he was walking upstairs.  She will 
also tell you that she heard the two shots fired within thirty seconds after David reached 
upstairs, one of those bullets having killed David.  After presenting this evidence, the 
Prosecution will have proven its case that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of first-degree murder. 
 
Defense Opening Statement 
 
 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This is not a story of an angry wife killing her 
husband in a fit of rage.  This is a story of an abused woman acting in self-defense.  You 
will hear from Ann Hudson herself, who will reveal to you the abuse she has suffered at 
the hands of her husband during the five years of their marriage.  She will tell you that on 
numerous occasions, the abuse was so severe that she required medical attention.  Ann 
will explain to you how she was too afraid to leave her marriage out of fear that her 
husband would track her down and kill her.  From her testimony, you will understand that 
she had no recourse on the night of October 17, 2011 than to defend herself against her 
husband whom she believed wanted to kill her. At the end of this trial, you will see that 
the defendant’s action was justified by self-defense and that Ann Hudson is not guilty of 
first-degree murder. Thank you. 
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The following are summaries of witnesses’ testimonies during direct and cross-
examinations.  These summaries include all facts that were presented during trial. 
 
Prosecution Case 
Direct Examination of Morgan Johnson 
 
Morgan Johnson is David’s sister.  She testified that she knew Ann Hudson for 
about 10 years even before Ann started dating David.  Morgan was invited by David to 
his party at his house on the night of October 17, 2011.  Morgan arrived at his house 
around 10:00PM with three of her friends.  She testified that while they were eating 
dinner, Morgan told Ann that her cooking was “not up to par and then Ann got really 
upset.”  Ann yelled at Morgan.  Morgan said that she got upset too and they began yelling 
at each other. 
Morgan further testified that David got involved in the argument.  He told Ann 
that she should “take my [Morgan’s] criticism constructively” so that she could “do a 
better job of cooking dinner in the future.  Ann didn’t take too well to that.”  Morgan said 
that she heard Ann screaming at David that she had tried her best and that David did not 
appreciate her effort.  Morgan also heard David yell back to Ann that “she takes 
everything too personally.” 
Morgan saw Ann run upstairs and heard Ann slam a door shut.  Morgan testified 
to hearing Ann’s muffled yelling through the door.  After ten minutes of Ann’s shouting, 
David went upstairs.  Morgan said that David appeared to have calmed down by that 
point and that he said to Morgan, “I guess I should go see her.”  Morgan said that at that 
point, David appeared calm and collected.  David walked upstairs and Morgan heard him 
open a door.  She did not hear anything for the next few seconds.  Morgan said that thirty 
seconds later, she heard a gunshot and then another shot.  Morgan ran upstairs, went 
through the bedroom door, and saw David lying on the ground, face up, in a pool of 
blood.  Morgan saw Ann in the opposite corner of the room holding a gun, and then 
Morgan called the police.  Morgan said that David died that night. 
 
Defense Cross Examination of Morgan Johnson 
 
Morgan used to go out socially with Ann before her marriage to David.  After the 
wedding, Ann refused to engage in social outings and preferred instead to stay at home.  
Morgan testified that she never saw Ann with a bruise until after her marriage to David 
Johnson.  Morgan saw Ann with a new bruise approximately once every two months.  
Morgan asked Ann about her bruises, but Ann never told Morgan how she got them.  
Morgan said that she “got the feeling that Ann was covering up for someone.”  Morgan 
said that she has rarely seen Ann and David get into a fight, but the few times that she did 
see them argue, Ann always quickly apologized and tried to calm him down.  In these 
situations, Morgan heard the defendant say, “I’m so stupid.  Why do I always do things 
that make him angry?”  Morgan has never heard Ann yell at David until the night of his 
death. 
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Defense Case 
Direct Examination of Ann Hudson 
 
Ann testified that during the five years of her marriage to David Johnson, David 
had abused her.  Ann said that their relationship began without violence for the first few 
months, but then David became increasingly more aggressive toward her.  He frequently 
grew upset when she asked him if she could go out with her friends or family, if she did 
not cook the way he liked, or if she did not want to have sexual intercourse with him.  
During their verbal arguments he called Ann a “bitch” and “whore.”  Ann testified that 
during physical altercations, David punched Ann in her stomach and chest, slapped her 
across the face, and grabbed her by the arms and shook her vigorously.  Ann said that 
during one incident in 2010, David pinned her against the wall and choked her, and then 
he threw her onto the couch.  Ann went to the hospital the next day complaining of 
dizziness and an intense headache.  She said that the doctor told her she had a concussion.  
Ann did not tell David that she had a concussion because she “did not want to make him 
feel bad.” 
Ann testified that there were times when David told her, “You make me want to 
kill you.”  Ann said that she feared for her life when David was angry, but believed that 
he had no control over his anger and that she should not provoke him.  Ann said that she 
has been feeling depressed during the majority of their marriage and was “overwhelmed 
with guilt” for every time she had caused a fight.  In the year 2009, she told her mother 
about the abuse, and her mother convinced Ann to move out of the house.  However, Ann 
testified that, in the end, she did not move out of the house because when David found 
out about her plans, he became enraged and threatened Ann, saying that if she left, he 
would “hunt her down and kill her and then come after her mother.”  Ann testified that 
she was too afraid of provoking David to leave the relationship. 
Ann said that David was her only friend since she never went out socially with 
other people.  Ann said that David grew jealous whenever she would leave with other 
people, so she stopped.  Ann also testified that she did not get herself a job because David 
insisted that she stay at home and leave the finances up to David. 
Ann said that on the night of October 17, 2011, Ann had become angry with 
Morgan Johnson because Morgan had criticized her cooking.  Ann and Morgan got into a 
verbal fight.  David intervened and told Ann to not “take everything so personally.”  Ann 
ran upstairs, upset, into her bedroom and slammed the door shut.  Through the closed 
door, Ann continued to shout about how she had tried her best but no one appreciated her 
efforts.  Eventually, David opened the bedroom door.  Ann testified that David had “the 
same look on his face as when he had choked [her]” in 2010.  Ann believed that he was 
about to violently attack and kill her, so she pulled out David’s gun that she knew he kept 
in the bedroom closet.  David took a few quick steps toward Ann and then Ann shot the 
gun once, missing David.  He lunged toward her but she shot him in the head and he fell 
to the ground.  Ann testified that she was terrified and ran to the corner of the room.  
Morgan Johnson entered the room and called the police. 
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Prosecution Cross Examination of Ann Hudson 
  
 Ann admitted that after David had choked her in 2010, she did not leave her 
husband.  Ann testified that she did not see leaving the relationship as an option of 
escape, and so she never did successfully leave. 
Ann testified that on the night of David’s death, David never threatened that he 
was going to kill her.  Ann admitted that when David was in the bedroom with her, she 
did not scream even though she knew there were other people in the house.  Ann said that 
for a few years now she knew that David kept a gun in the bedroom closet.  Ann admitted 
that she was angry when she was in the bedroom and that she had been shouting for ten 
minutes before David entered.  She had been yelling before then as well while Morgan 
and David were downstairs.  Ann admitted that, on the night of October 17, 2011, David 
did not raise his hand to hit her, he did not have a weapon in his hand, and he did not 
have his hands formed into fists.  Ann stated that when she saw the look on David’s face, 
she “knew [she] had to shoot him to stop him.” 
 
Defense Closing Statement 
  
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This case is not a case of malicious murder.  
This is a case of self-defense.  First, you heard from the prosecution witness, Morgan 
Johnson.  During cross-examination, you learned that during the five years of their 
marriage, David would punch, shake, choke, and throw around his wife.  Ann Hudson did 
not know what to do.  She told you herself that she talked to her mother and tried to 
leave, but David threatened to kill her and to hurt her mother.  She was too afraid to 
leave.  So, she did the only thing she knew she could do within those few seconds, when 
David was walking toward her with the look that indicated he was going to kill her.  
Without thinking, she grabbed the gun that was in the closet nearby and shot him out of 
self-defense.  When you deliberate today, remember that an act of self-defense is defined 
as a reasonable response to an imminent harm and that the response used proportional 
force to that imminent harm.  Ann Hudson had no alternative she knew of.  She acted to 
save her own life.  Thank you. 
 
Prosecution Closing Argument 
 
 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This is not merely a case of malicious murder.  
It is a case of premeditated murder.  You heard from Morgan Johnson, who was present 
at David Johnson’s house on the night of October 17, 2011, say that the defendant was 
irritable.  She was yelling at her sister-in-law, then at her husband David, then stormed 
upstairs, slammed her door shut, and continued to shout in the bedroom.  For ten whole 
minutes she was in that room.  For ten whole minutes she had time to think of her next 
move, and she did.  She told you that she thought of shooting him before she pulled that 
trigger.  When David Johnson walked up the stairs and reached the bedroom door, it took 
only thirty seconds for Ann Hudson to fire the gun.  Twice.  During cross-examination of 
the defendant, she told you that she knew there were other people in the house.  If she 
were truly afraid of her husband, a more reasonable response than shooting David would 
have been to call out for help.  She had other options than to killing David.  As the 
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prosecution, we bear the burden in the case.  It is up to us to prove to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Ann Hudson deliberately and with premeditation shot and killed 
her husband.  Self-defense is defined as a reasonable person’s response, with proportional 
force, to an imminent harm.  You must ask yourself if the defendant acted reasonably and 
used proportionate force.  When you do, I am sure you will come back with a guilty 
verdict.  Thank you. 
 
Jury Instructions 
 
 First Degree Murder 
To prove the crime of First Degree Murder, the State must prove the following 
three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. David Johnson is dead. 
2. The death was caused by the criminal act of Ann Hudson. 
3. There was a premeditated killing of Ann Hudson. 
Definitions. 
“Killing with premeditation” is killing after consciously deciding to do so.  The 
decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing.  The law does not fix the 
exact period of time that must pass between the formation of the premeditated intent to 
kill and the killing.  The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing. 
The question of premeditation is a question of fact to be determined by you from 
the evidence.  It will be sufficient proof of premeditation if the circumstances of the 
killing and the conduct of the accused convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
existence of premeditation at the time of the killing. 
 
 Self-Defense 
 After you have considered all of the evidence in this case, if you find that the state 
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of first degree murder, you must go 
on to consider whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense. 
 A person is justified in the use of force against another person that would 
otherwise be illegal if she is acting in self-defense.  It is a complete defense to first degree 
murder. 
 There is a statute that defines self-defense and you are to apply that definition in 
reviewing evidence in this case.  The statute defining self-defense reads as follows: a 
person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend 
herself from what she reasonably believes to be the use of imminent use of physical 
force, and she may use such degree of force which she reasonably believes to be 
necessary for such purpose. 
 Reasonable Beliefs. 
 You must consider whether the defendant justifiably acted in self-defense.  The 
test you are to apply is a subjective-objective test, meaning that it has some subjective 
aspects and some objective aspects.  You must first consider the situation from the 
perspective of the defendant; that is, what did the defendant actually believe as best as 
can be inferred from the evidence.  This is the subjective aspect of the test.  The statute 
requires, however, that the defendant’s belief be reasonable, and not irrational or 
unreasonable under the circumstances; that is, would a reasonable person in the 
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defendant’s circumstances have reached that belief.  This is the objective aspect of the 
test. 
 Self-defense has four elements: 
1. The defendant actually believed that the other person (1) was using or about to 
use deadly physical force against her, or (2) was inflicting or about to inflict great 
bodily harm upon her. 
2. That belief was reasonable because a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
circumstances, viewing those circumstances from the defendant’s perspective, 
would have shared that belief. 
3. The defendant actually believed that deadly physical force was necessary to repel 
the attack. 
4. That belief was reasonable because a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
circumstances, viewing those circumstances from the defendant’s perspective, 
would have shared that belief. 
 
Verdict 
The defendant has no burden of proof regarding any of these elements.  Instead, 
the State bears the sole and exclusive burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant did not act in self-defense, a burden it can meet by disproving at least one 
of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any o the 
elements of first-degree murder, you shall then find the defendant not guilty and not 
consider the defense. 
If you find that all the elements of first-degree murder have been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you shall then consider the defense.  If you find that the State has 
disproved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the elements of the defense, you 
must reject that defense and find the defendant guilty. 
 If, on the other hand, you find that the State has not disproved beyond a 
reasonable doubt at least one of the elements of the defense, then on the strength of that 
defense alone you must find the defendant not guilty despite the fact that you have found 
the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You are now released to deliberate and render your verdict. 
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Appendix D 
Control, Active Condition 
 
Everything is the same as the “Control, Passive” condition except for the cross-
examination of Morgan Johnson, the direct examination of Ann Hudson, and the Defense 
and Prosecution closing statements.  The changes are underlined: 
 
Defense Cross Examination of Morgan Johnson 
 
Morgan went out socially with Ann both before and during her marriage to David.  
During her marriage, Ann told Morgan that Ann had to “sneak out of the house without 
David knowing” to be able to go see her friends.  Morgan testified that she never saw 
Ann with a bruise until after her marriage to David Johnson.  Morgan saw Ann with a 
new bruise approximately once every two months.  Morgan asked Ann about her bruises 
and Ann told her that David hit her.  Morgan said that she “figured Ann could take care 
of herself.”  Morgan said that she had rarely seen Ann and David get into a fight, but the 
few times that she did see them argue, Ann and David would always yell and push each 
other.  In these situations, Morgan heard the defendant yell, “You’re always causing these 
fights!  I don’t deserve this!”  Morgan stated that Ann “seemed like a prideful woman.” 
 
Defense Case 
Direct Examination of Ann Hudson 
 
Ann testified that during the five years of her marriage to David Johnson, David 
had abused her.  Ann said that their relationship began without violence for the first few 
months, but then David became increasingly more aggressive toward her.  He frequently 
grew upset when she asked him if she could go out with her friends or family, if she did 
not cook the way he liked, or if she did not want to have sexual intercourse with him.  
During their verbal arguments he called Ann a “bitch” and “whore.”  Ann testified that 
during physical altercations, David punched Ann in her stomach and chest, slapped her 
across the face, and grabbed her by the arms and shook her vigorously.  Ann said that 
during one incident in 2010, David pinned her against the wall and choked her, and then 
he threw her onto the couch.  Ann went to the hospital the next day complaining of 
dizziness and an intense headache.  She said that the doctor told her she had a concussion.  
Ann told David about the concussion and told him that it was “all his fault” and that “he 
should feel guilty” for what he did. 
Ann testified that there were times when David told her, “You make me want to 
kill you.”  Ann said that she feared for her life when David was angry, and that he 
deliberately wanted to intimidate and threaten her.  Ann said that she has been feeling 
frustrated during the majority of their marriage and felt trapped.  In the year 2009, she 
told her mother about the abuse, and her mother tried to help Ann to move out of the 
house.  However, Ann testified that, in the end, she did not move out of the house 
because when David found out about her plans, he became enraged and threatened Ann, 
saying that if she left, he would “hunt her down and kill her and then come after her 
mother.”  Ann also tried calling the police on several occasions in the years 2009 and 
2010, but again, David threatened her, saying, “If you get me thrown in jail, I’ll be free 
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eventually and that’s when I’ll get you.”  Ann testified that she was too afraid of what 
David might do to her if she left the relationship. 
Ann said that David grew jealous whenever she would leave with other people, so 
she started “sneaking out the house without David knowing.”  Ann also testified that 
David insisted that she quit her job as a bank teller so that she could stay at home, but 
Ann resisted. 
Ann said that on the night of October 17, 2011, Ann had become angry with 
Morgan Johnson because Morgan had criticized her cooking.  Ann and Morgan got into a 
verbal fight.  David intervened and told Ann to not “take everything so personally.”  Ann 
ran upstairs, upset, into her bedroom and slammed the door shut.  Through the closed 
door, Ann continued to shout about how she had tried her best but no one appreciated her 
efforts.  Eventually, David opened the bedroom door.  Ann testified that David had “the 
same look on his face as when he had choked [her]” in 2010.  Ann believed that he was 
about to violently attack and kill her, so she pulled out David’s gun that she knew he kept 
in the bedroom closet.  David took a few quick steps toward Ann and then Ann shot the 
gun once, missing David.  He lunged toward her but she shot him in the head and he fell 
to the ground.  Ann testified that she was terrified and ran to the corner of the room.  
Morgan Johnson entered the room and called the police. 
 
 
Defense Closing Statement 
  
 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This case is not a case of malicious murder.  
This is a case of self-defense.  First, you heard from the prosecution witness, Morgan 
Johnson.  During cross-examination, you learned that during the five years of their 
marriage, David would punch, shake, choke, and throw around his wife.  Ann Hudson did 
not know what to do.  She told you herself that she talked to her mother and tried to 
leave, but David threatened to kill her and to hurt her mother.  Ann also tried calling the 
police, but David threatened her that eventually when he would have gotten out of prison, 
he would have come after Ann.  She was too afraid to leave.  So, she did the only thing 
she knew she could do within those few seconds, when David was walking toward her 
with the look that indicated he was going to kill her.  Without thinking, she grabbed the 
gun that was in the closet nearby and shot him out of self-defense.  When you deliberate 
today, remember that an act of self-defense is defined as a reasonable response to an 
imminent harm and that the response used proportional force to that imminent harm.  
Ann Hudson had no alternative she knew of.  She acted to save her own life.  Thank you. 
 
Prosecution Closing Argument 
 
 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This is not merely a case of malicious murder.  
It is a case of premeditated murder.  You heard from Morgan Johnson, who was present 
at David Johnson’s house on the night of October 17, 2011, say that the defendant was 
irritable and aggressive.  She was yelling at her sister-in-law, then at her husband David, 
then stormed upstairs, slammed her door shut, and continued to shout in the bedroom.  
For ten whole minutes she was in that room.  For ten whole minutes she had time to think 
of her next move, and she did.  She told you that she thought of shooting him before she 
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pulled that trigger.  When David Johnson walked up the stairs and reached the bedroom 
door, it took only thirty seconds for Ann Hudson to fire the gun.  Twice.  During cross-
examination of the defendant, she told you that she knew there were other people in the 
house.  If she were truly afraid of her husband, a more reasonable response than shooting 
David would have been to call out for help.  She had other options than to killing David.  
As the prosecution, we bear the burden in the case.  It is up to us to prove to you beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Ann Hudson deliberately and with premeditation shot and killed 
her husband.  Self-defense is defined as a reasonable person’s response, with proportional 
force, to an imminent harm.  You must ask yourself if the defendant acted reasonably and 
used proportionate force.  When you do, I am sure you will come back with a guilty 
verdict.  Thank you. 
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Appendix E 
Passive, BWS Condition 
 
Everything is the same as the “Control, Passive” condition except for the Defense 
opening statement, direct and cross-examination of the expert witness, and the Defense 
closing statement.  The changes are underlined: 
 
Defense Opening Statement 
 
 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This is not a story of an angry wife killing her 
husband in a fit of rage.  This is a story of an abused woman acting in self-defense.  You 
will hear from Ann Hudson herself, who will reveal to you the abuse she has suffered at 
the hands of her husband during the five years of their marriage.  She will tell you that on 
numerous occasions, the abuse was so severe that she required medical attention.  Ann 
will explain to you how she was too afraid to leave her marriage out of fear that her 
husband would track her down and kill her.  You will then hear from Dr. Baxter, a 
specialized psychologist, who will tell you that Ann’s behavior suggested she suffered 
from Battered Woman Syndrome.  Dr. Baxter will testify that Ann could not have 
believed she could escape from her relationship with David.  From the doctor’s and 
Ann’s testimonies, you will understand that she had no recourse on the night of October 
17, 2011 than to defend herself against her husband whom she believed wanted to kill 
her. At the end of this trial, you will see that the defendant’s action was justified by self-
defense and that Ann Hudson is not guilty of first-degree murder. Thank you. 
 
Defense Direct Examination of Dr. Baxter 
 
Dr. Baxter is a psychologist specializing in the counseling and treatment of 
battered women with publications in numerous journals and presentations at several 
conferences.  Dr. Baxter has been working with victims of domestic violence for the past 
20 years.  The doctor has conducted extensive research on the dynamics of battering and 
its impact on women.  In the present case, Dr. Baxter has interviewed Ann Hudson for a 
period of three hours and reviewed Ann’s medical history.  The psychologist testified that 
Ann’s behavior leading up to the shooting was consistent with Battered Woman 
Syndrome.  Ann experienced the “cycle of abuse” like most battered women.  The cycle 
consists of three stages: tension-building, acute battering, and loving and remorse.  First, 
as Dr. Baxter testified, there was the “tension-building” phase, in which Ann’s husband 
David committed multiple minor incidents of abuse against her.  Second, the “acute 
battering” phase followed, which was when David choked Ann and threw her.  Third, the 
“loving and remorse” phase occurred when David apologized to Ann and promised to 
never hurt her again.  Dr. Baxter stated that battered women typically believe that they 
can change their batterer’s behavior, and Ann believed David’s promises of change.  The 
cycle of abuse repeats itself until the relationship ends.  Dr. Baxter testified that Ann 
displayed signs of “learned helplessness,” meaning that Ann believed that resistance to 
the abuse was futile.  She was resigned to staying in the relationship and was submissive 
to her husband. 
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Dr. Baxter stated that the battered woman, such as Ann, is always in a state of 
fear.  The violence does not need to be constant since the threat is always there.  Battered 
women believe that their batterer can be dangerous at any time.  For Ann, trying to leave 
the relationship is anxiety-provoking because of David’s threats on her life if she were to 
leave.  Ann, in accordance with Battered Woman Syndrome, had developed a heightened 
sensitivity to her husband’s violence.  Battered women can typically predict the onset of 
an attack before a blow is ever struck. 
 
Prosecution Cross-Examination of Dr. Baxter 
 
 Dr. Baxter conceded that different people respond differently to similar situations.  
The psychologist stated that battered women respond in a variety of ways.  Most battered 
women do not kill their abusers and some women escape their abusive relationships 
successfully. 
 
Defense Closing Statement 
  
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This case is not a case of malicious murder.  
This is a case of self-defense.  First, you heard from the prosecution witness, Morgan 
Johnson.  During cross-examination, you learned that during the five years of their 
marriage, David would punch, shake, choke, and throw around his wife.  Ann Hudson did 
not know what to do.  She told you herself that she talked to her mother and tried to 
leave, but David threatened to kill her and to hurt her mother.  She was too afraid to 
leave.  According to Dr. Baxter, Ann’s behavior indicated that she suffered from Battered 
Woman’s Syndrome.  She was conditioned to be helpless and was put through the misery 
of enduring a long cycle of violence.  She became sensitive to predicting when her 
husband would explode with rage.  Ann knew what to expect on the night of October 17, 
2011.  So, she did the only thing she knew she could do within those few seconds, when 
David was walking toward her with the look that indicated he was going to kill her.  
Without thinking, she grabbed the gun that was in the closet nearby and shot him out of 
self-defense.  When you deliberate today, remember that an act of self-defense is defined 
as a reasonable response to an imminent harm and that the response used proportional 
force to that imminent harm.  Ann Hudson had no alternative she knew of.  She acted to 
save her own life.  Thank you. 
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Appendix F 
Active, BWS Condition 
 
This condition is the same as the “Control, Active” condition, except also with the 
changes presented in the “Passive, BWS” condition. 
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Appendix G 
Passive, SAF Condition 
 
Everything is the same as the “Control, Passive” condition except for the Defense 
opening statement, direct and cross-examination of the expert witness, and the Defense 
closing statement: 
 
Defense Opening Statement 
 
 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This is not a story of an angry wife killing her 
husband in a fit of rage.  This is a story of an abused woman acting in self-defense.  You 
will hear from Ann Hudson herself, who will reveal to you the abuse she has suffered at 
the hands of her husband during the five years of their marriage.  She will tell you that on 
numerous occasions, the abuse was so severe that she required medical attention.  Ann 
will explain to you how she was too afraid to leave her marriage out of fear that her 
husband would track her down and kill her.  You will then hear from Dr. Baxter, a 
specialized psychologist, who will tell you that Ann did not have the social agency to find 
options of escape.  Dr. Baxter will testify that Ann could not have seen any immediate 
options of escape from her relationship with David.  From the psychologist’s and Ann’s 
testimonies, you will understand that she had no recourse on the night of October 17, 
2011 than to defend herself against her husband whom she believed wanted to kill her. At 
the end of this trial, you will see that the defendant’s action was justified by self-defense 
and that Ann Hudson is not guilty of first-degree murder. Thank you. 
 
Defense Direct Examination of Dr. Baxter 
 
Dr. Baxter is a psychologist specializing in the counseling and treatment of 
abused women with publications in numerous journals and presentations at several 
conferences.  Dr. Baxter has been working with victims of domestic violence for the past 
20 years.  The doctor has conducted extensive research on the dynamics of battering and 
its impact on women.  In the present case, Dr. Baxter has interviewed Ann Hudson for a 
period of three hours and reviewed Ann’s medical history.  The psychologist testified that 
due to Ann’s limited resources, she was unable to perceive any options of escape before 
the shooting.  Dr. Baxter called this the “social-agency framework,” which explores the 
abused woman’s social and financial circumstances to determine her ability to leave her 
husband.  In Ann’s case, Dr. Baxter stated that her husband David regulated the 
household’s financial income through their shared bank account.  He gave Ann a monthly 
allowance that only large enough for her to buy groceries and run other errands.  David 
also persuaded Ann to not attend college, which prevented her from attaining a higher-
level job with a larger income.  Dr. Baxter noted that in terms of social limitations, David 
refused to allow Ann to see her friends and family.  David would become jealous 
whenever Ann went out, accusing her of cheating.  Dr. Baxter testified that to Ann, the 
police were of no help either, because she was afraid that if she did call the police, then 
her husband would kill her.  
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Dr. Baxter stated that due to her limited social and financial resources, Ann 
believed she was trapped in the relationship and was always in a state of fear.  The 
violence does not need to be constant since the threat is always there.    
 
Prosecution Cross-Examination of Dr. Baxter 
 
 Dr. Baxter conceded that different people respond differently to similar situations.  
The psychologist stated that abused women respond in a variety of ways.  Most abused 
women do not kill their husbands and some women escape their abusive relationships 
successfully. 
 
Defense Closing Statement 
  
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury.  This case is not a case of malicious murder.  This is a 
case of self-defense.  First, you heard from the prosecution witness, Morgan Johnson.  
During cross-examination, you learned that during the five years of their marriage, David 
would punch, shake, choke, and throw around his wife.  Ann Hudson did not know what 
to do.  She told you herself that she talked to her mother and tried to leave, but David 
threatened to kill her and to hurt her mother.  She was too afraid to leave.  According to 
Dr. Baxter, Ann was trapped in her abusive relationship because she lacked the social and 
financial resources to escape.  She could not support herself financially since David 
controlled the household’s finances and prevented her from furthering her education.  
David also threatened her to stay away from her friends, family, and the police.  She was 
stuck in a house of reoccurring violence.  So, she did the only thing she knew she could 
do within those few seconds, when David was walking toward her with the look that 
indicated he was going to kill her.  Without thinking, she grabbed the gun that was in the 
closet nearby and shot him out of self-defense.  When you deliberate today, remember 
that an act of self-defense is defined as a reasonable response to an imminent harm and 
that the response used proportional force to that imminent harm.  Ann Hudson had no 
alternative she knew of.  She acted to save her own life.  Thank you.  
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Appendix H 
Active, SAF Condition 
 
This condition is the same as the “Control, Active” condition, except also with the 
changes presented in the “Passive, SAF” condition. 
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Appendix I 
Attitudes toward Spousal Abuse and Battered Women Scale 
Instructions: This is a questionnaire to determine your attitudes and beliefs on a legal 
issue.  Please answer each statement by giving as true a picture of your own position as 
possible.  Please complete the survey by using the following options: 
 
Women can leave abusive relationships if they really wanted to. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Battered women are masochists; they like to be hit. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Women often provoke attacks in abusive relationships. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Successful women can be targets of abuse by their husbands. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Battered women get what they deserve. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Battering only occurs in lower-class families. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Strong religious beliefs will prevent abuse from occurring. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
If a battered woman called the police, she would not have a problem anymore. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
If women would stand up for themselves, they would not be abused. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
A man should be able to run his household as he pleases. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Battered women are usually uneducated and have few job skills. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
The police do not care about domestic violence. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
It is okay for a man to hit his wife if he has a good reason. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
If violence has been used once in a relationship, there is a potential that it will be used 
again. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Trying to leave her husband may bring about further abuse to the woman. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Abused women stay with their husbands because they are dependent on them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Women in abusive relationships can tell when further abuse will occur. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Abused women have good reason to believe their husbands may eventually kill them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Women who kill their husbands have exhausted all other possibilities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
In any situation, there are alternatives to murder. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
Self-defense is justification for use of deadly force. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
There are times when defendants charged with murder should be found not guilty. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
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Appendix J 
Response History Scale 
The defendant has low self-esteem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
The defendant was confrontational. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
The defendant blames herself for the abuse. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
The defendant is a passive woman. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
The defendant told other people about her husband abusing her. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
The defendant was submissive to her husband. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
The defendant often fought back against her husband. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
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Appendix K 
Typicality Scale 
Did you find that the defendant, in any way, resembled a normal battered woman? 
Yes No 
Does the defendant’s behavior fit with the behavior of a typical battered woman? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No fit at all           Somewhat a fit          Perfect fit 
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Appendix L 
Witness Credibility Scale 
Instructions: Please rate the expert witness for the following items on the scale provided: 
Not at all trustworthy              Very Trustworthy 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all truthful                   Very Truthful 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all dependable                         Very Dependable 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all honest        Very Honest 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all reliable        Very Reliable 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all informed        Very Informed 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all logical        Very Logical 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
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Not at all educated        Very Educated 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all credible                 Very Credible 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all wise         Very Wise 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
Not at all scientific                 Very Scientific 
1          2                3                4                5                6                7 
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Appendix M 
Self-defense scale 
The defendant believed that her husband was about to inflict great bodily harm or kill her. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
The defendant's belief in imminent harm was reasonable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
The defendant believed that deadly force was necessary to repel her husband's attack. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
The defendant's belief in deadly force being necessary was reasonable. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
 
The defendant had more reasonable options than killing her husband. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Strongly Disagree               Strongly Agree 
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Appendix N 
Verdict Confidence Scale 
Select which verdict you would give to Ann Hudson: 
  Guilty  Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Confident                       Very Confident 
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Appendix O 
Demographics questionnaire 
 
Was there an expert witness in this case scenario? 
  Yes  No 
 
If so, did the expert witness say that Ann Hudson’s behavior was consistent with 
Battered Woman Syndrome? 
  Yes  No 
 
Please select your sex:   Male   Female 
 
What is your ethnicity? __________________ 
 
Are you married?   Yes  No 
 
What is your age?  ____________ 
 
Have you ever been called for jury duty before?   Yes  No 
 If so, did you serve on a jury?   Yes  No 
 
  If so, was it a criminal or civil trial?   Criminal  Civil 
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Appendix P 
Debriefing Form 
 
 Thank you for your participation.  This study analyzes the effectiveness of certain 
kinds of self-defense cases for battered women who kill their husbands.  This information 
will lead to the development of effective methods to help jurors understand the unique 
predicament that battered women face. 
 If you feel uncomfortable with the information that was presented in the case 
transcript, you may seek counseling services to help minimize your discomfort.  In the 
Claremont colleges, you may call the Monsour Counseling and Psychological Services at 
(909) 621-8202.  For elsewhere, please look up your local counseling centers, or if you 
need help in finding such services, you may contact the research at snikoo12@cmc.edu.  
In the event that you wish to express concern about this study, please contact one of the 
following: 
 Dr. Daniel Krauss (dkrauss@cmc.edu); 
 Dr. Shana Levin (slevin@cmc.edu) 
 If you are interested in learning about the results of the study, feel free to email 
the researcher at snikoo12@cmc.edu.  If you would like to learn more about self-defense 
cases for battered women, you may refer to the book Forensic and Legal Psychology by 
Mark Costanzo and Daniel Krauss. 
 Please refrain from discussing this survey and the case transcript with anyone 
until after April of 2011.  It is vital for participants to not be aware of the information in 
this study before they take the survey.  By not knowing about the study’s materials before 
hand, participants’ answers will more likely reflect their true, and not biased, responses. 
 Your participation is much appreciated! 
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APPENDIX Q 
Mediational models 
Model 1: 
 
Model 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Response history 
x expert 
testimony type 
Verdict 
confidence 
Expert 
witness 
credibility 
Response history 
x expert 
testimony type 
Verdict 
confidence 
Defendant 
typicality 
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Model 3: 
 
 
 
  
Gender Verdict 
confidence 
Attitudes 
toward 
spousal abuse 
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Appendix R 
Full mediation model 
 
Gender Verdict 
confidence 
Attitudes 
toward 
spousal abuse 
 r= .14 
 r= .34  r= ..32 
